NOTES
[1] Most Americans overestimate the amount of progress that has been made (Kraus et al. 2017) – although most also recognize that ‘more changes are needed’ to achieve racial equality (Parker et al. 2016).
[2] There is a sense in which we are only looking at one half of the equation here. People of color often knowingly and actively take actions that reproduce inequality too (Rafanell & Gorringe 2010) – albeit typically because they do not see viable alternatives (Babcock 2014, Mullainathan & Shafir 2014). However, should the primary beneficiaries of contemporary racialized inequality change how they exercise their agency, it would open more possibilities for its primary casualties to do the same. Hence the focus here on those who profit most from the prevailing order and its racial dynamics.
[3] These schools produce a radically disproportionate share of all tenured faculty (Warner & Clauset 2015). They set the dominant frames and research agendas (Wellmon & Piper 2017), and shape policies and procedures (Altbach 2010), for colleges and universities nationwide. Despite being non-representative of most faculty or students nationwide, they also widely shape public perceptions and narratives about universities (Casselman 2016, Friedersdorf 2016).
[4] Whites are dramatically overrepresented, and blacks and Hispanics significantly underrepresented, within academia – to include social research fields. Social scientists are disproportionately white and even more disproportionately left-leaning (al-Gharbi 2018b). Similar patterns hold for journalists (Willnat et al. 2017).
[5] Even suburban districts where wealth is concentrated have increasingly been trending “blue” (Geismer & Lassiter 2018).
[6] Most poor people in America today live in “red” districts; the areas seeing increases in poverty tend to be suburban communities, particularly within “red” states (Kneebone 2016) — which have long tended to receive more than they contribute in federal income taxes (Tierney 2014).
[7] Even higher-income individuals who live in rural, suburban, less economically-polarized areas (which trend “red”) tend to be more generous than their socio-economic peers who live in highly-unequal areas (Cote et al. 2015).
[8] A recent study (Hall et al. 2018) found similar patterns in attitudes versus actions with respect to environmentalism: Those who believed in climate change were much more supportive of federal policies to protect the environment, but climate change skeptics tended to have more environmentally-friendly lifestyles and behaviors.
[9] Mirroring the “doing well by doing good” mentality among upper-income or upwardly-mobile, highly-educated urban whites, companies have been increasingly highlighting their charitable giving, or even taking ‘bold’ stances on culture-war issues — signaling towards antiracism, feminism or LGBTQ rights, etc. — as a way of selling more of their products and services to this key financial demographic, who seem to (literally) buy into these symbolic gestures despite these companies’ actual track records and ongoing behaviors with respect to their employees, contractors, the environment, etc. (Iqbal 2019; Holder 2017; Abad-Santos 2018).
[10] Despite being less likely to give — and tending to give less of their overall income away than lower SES Americans – the relatively well-off are much more likely to itemize charitable deductions. In virtue of their falling into higher tax brackets, government revenues are drained much more by write-offs from these taxpayers than those from the lower and middle classes. According to an analysis by the Tax Policy Center (2018, p. 262), each dollar in charitable donations from the bottom 60% of the income distribution reduced the federal government’s income by less than 4 cents. However, the cost to the government of every charitable dollar increases rapidly in the upper quintiles. At the pinnacle of the distribution, each philanthropic dollar from someone in the top 1% of earners reduced government funds by 32 cents. The Tax Policy Center estimates that charitable donations cost the federal government around $44 billionin tax revenues for 2018 alone, overwhelmingly via deductions from people making $100k per year or more. And of course, state governments also take a hit insofar as they allow charitable deductions on their taxes too (most do).
[11] Perhaps the most striking aspect of these statistics is the broad and inclusive definition of ‘underserved communities’ utilized in the study: domestic workers, economically disadvantaged people, immigrants and refugees, incarcerated and formerly incarcerated people, LGBTQ people, people of color, people with disabilities, people with HIV/ AIDS, sex workers, women and girls or victims of crime and abuse (Schlegal 2016, Appendix A). All of these groups combined receive less than a third of all U.S. charitable foundation funding, and the vast majority of American charitable foundations dedicate less than half of their grants to helping any of these groups – individually or collectively.
[12] Similar dynamics hold with regards to sex. Contemporary American adults report having less sex with their partners than previous cohorts – a trend that is especially pronounced among highly-educated and married couples (Twenge et al. 2017). Yet there has been a corresponding increase in demand for prostitution, particularly in urban areas, facilitated by online platforms to connect sex workers to “johns” (Chan et al. 2019). “Hobbyists” – i.e. those who regularly connect to sex workers through internet sites like The Erotic Review — are disproportionately white, married, highly-educated and financially well-off: More than 84% are above the median national income in the United States; a plurality (43%) make $120k per year or more. 79% have a B.A. or higher, with a plurality (41%) possessing graduate degrees. More than 84% are white (Monto & Milrod 2014). Meanwhile, cis and trans women of color comprise the vast majority of sex workers nationwide (Dank et al. 2014).
[13] At the initial phase of the merchandise delivery process are processing and fulfillment centers. These are precarious and low-wage jobs (Sammon 2019); working conditions often resemble sweatshops, with insufficient climate control or breaks, relentless tracking of production, and constant pressure to increase output (Godlewski 2018, Edwards 2013, Spicer 2018). These positions are disproportionately filled by blacks and Hispanics (Greene 2015).
[14] Despite asserting that benevolent racism is “discernable among various politicians, judges, journalists, civic leaders, and scholars of all races and across political lines,” Esposito & Romano primarily relied on conservatives and Republicans for their examples. This is surprising because people on the left are more likely to ostensibly champion black empowerment or condemn white privilege. As a result, one would expect examples of benevolent racism to be more common and readily apparent on the left (with other expressions of racism more prevalent on the right). Consider, for instance, ‘competence downshifting’: white liberals often seem to patronize minorities in a misguided attempt to better affiliate with them. This is not something conservatives generally do (Dupree & Fiske 2018).
[15] Social elites have consistently increased policing and incarceration of blacks in the service of ostensibly noble, liberal, technocratic goals. For instance, in the early 20th century, leaders of the progressive social reform movement sought to rationalize and humanize capitalism. Under these auspices they instituted immigration restrictions, redlining, and even eugenics programs to contain and diminish minority populations — held to be too large ‘for their own good’ (Leonard 2017). During the Truman era, the carceral state was established ostensibly to protect African Americans from ‘mob justice’ and insufficiently-professionalized law enforcement (Murakawa 2014). During the civil rights era, LBJ declared a “War on Crime” in order to help ‘respectable’ black leaders take control and transform their communities. This led to much more aggressive policing and surveillance of black communities, much higher levels of incarceration among blacks, and much more severe sentences for those convicted of crimes (Hinton 2016). But notice, all of these moves were justified under the auspices of positive, liberal, goals – allegedly to help African Americans themselves! Nonetheless, each of these maneuvers ultimately served to institutionalize and reinforce racialized inequality – using law enforcement to suppress resistance every step of the way.
[16] For instance, according to a recent Cato Institute survey, most (61% of) Americans believe “people often call others racist or sexist to avoid having to debate with them” (Ekins 2017).
[17] As former (Trump) White House Chief Strategist Steve Bannon put it: “The longer [Democrats] talk about identity politics, I got ‘em. I want them to talk about racism every day” (Kuttner 2017); “Race-identity politics…Just give me more. Tear down more statues. Say the revolution is coming” (Peters et al. 2017).
[18] Relatively well-off, highly-educated white liberals are among the strongest proponents for affordable housing (Edsall 2015) or accepting refugees (Ferwerda et al. 2017) in principle – yet often adopt a “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) position with regards to their own communities. In fact, as cities trend left, denizens tend to choke off new housing development (Kahn 2011). This increases costs of living and drives out poorer residents (Sorens 2018) – contributing significantly to racial segregation and the consolidation of minorities into areas of ‘concentrated disadvantage’ (Reeves 2017c, Rigsby 2016).
[19] These efforts are not a replacement for political activism, but should go hand-in-hand with campaigns to ensure all service workers receive a fair wage from their employers irrespective of customers’ generosity. Indeed, the history of tipped labor in the United States is steeped in racism. It grew popular, in part, as an attempt to avoid having to pay emancipated slaves an actual wage for their work. People of color, especially women, continue to disproportionately fill these positions today (Jayaraman 2016). Because their livelihood is contingent on the whims of their patrons, these workers often endure racism, sexism and other degrading and demeaning behaviors from customers in order to make a living. A telling statistic: in states that have guaranteed livable wages for service employees, workplace sexual harassment incidents are half as common as states without them (Robins 2018).
[20] In addition to general caretaking, minority or immigrant nannies are often expected to immerse children in another language and culture (Hua 2005). If these services are requested (or demanded) they should also be compensated – at the formal economy rate for a native-born white to provide a comparable education.
[21] Another example: an upwardly-mobile white professional views themselves as an ally to African Americans. (S)he is on a job interview. An offer is made. However, the candidate recognizes that there seem to be no black people on the team. Would (s)he be likely to say, “I’m sorry, I cannot accept this position. Please hire a person of color in my stead. Let me connect you to some qualified people I know”? Almost certainly not. Despite an awareness of systemic racism, they would likely believe that they earned this opportunity on merit. Perhaps, after they take the job they may complain to their new colleagues about the lack of diversity, and claim the next person hired should be an African American if possible. But of course, so long as everyone who is in such a position makes that same calculation – take the opportunity, and then lament the lack of diversity (among their overwhelmingly white peers) – change will remain elusive.
[22] While the funding levels and pedagogical approaches more privileged children enjoy are reliably and demonstrably successful at preparing these students to flourish, the educational outcomes at voucher schools targeting poor and minority children tend to be worse, on average, than at the public schools these children would have otherwise attended (Carey 2017).
[23] Note the use of “perceived” here. In fact, studies show that for relatively well-off parents, there is little effect in terms of children’s lifetime earnings from attending an elite school vs. not (Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2011) – or even having them attend an elite university vs. a less-selective one (Dale & Krueger 1999, 2011). Those who tend to benefit most from attending elite schools are minority students, especially those from disadvantaged backgrounds. The effects are negligible for white children who are already relatively well-off. That is, practically speaking, these families would not be sacrificing much by simply sending their kid to their zoned public school. Instead, they’d be saving themselves a lot of effort and money – and doing real social good in the process.
[24] As mentioned at the outset, this essay is focused on the primary beneficiaries of systemic racism (upper-middle class and wealthy whites who live in areas with large concentrations of immigrants and minorities), because these are the people who could most dramatically upend systemic racism through ascetic antiracism. However, it is important to note that relatively well-off people of color can also help dismantle racialized inequality by adopting this approach. In fact, this is essential — lest elites from historically marginalized or disadvantaged groups be co-opted by the prevailing order, reproducing systemic prejudice through their own actions and interactions, merely directed towards others instead (Reed 2018).
[25] For a great elaboration on this point – and an exploration of how understanding many social challenges as ‘problems of excess’ can change the way researchers approach the study of these phenomena (or seek to address them) – see Abbott 2016, pp. 122-159.