Q&A

From the comments on the Salon website, it appears as though this article was not well received by much of the magazine’s left-leaning readership. This is not surprising. In fact, I view it as a measure of success: the article was written to provoke uncomfortable soul-searching with people across the political spectrum. And despite the overwhelmingly negative response to the piece by most liberal commentators, there were indications that many readers were swayed by my arguments and reconsidered their reflexive positions on the Oregon standoff.

In any case, it is possible to consolidate most of the comments into a handful of objections which I will briefly address below:

What the militia is doing IS terrorism!
Here is the FBI definition: 

“‘Domestic terrorism’ means activities with the following three characteristics:
Involve acts dangerous to human life which
1. Violate federal or state law
2. Occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S., and
3. Appear intended to either:
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.”

First, I was more than a little amused that so many readers wanted to quote for me the legal definition of terrorism, given that I am a prolific/ recognized expert on the matter. Moreover, the article itself directly addressed the most relevant components of this definition, by design I should add. But let me explicitly address the definition point-by-point (concerns about length and flow prevented me from doing this in the article itself):

As it relates to points 1 and 2: the occupation of the wildlife refuge could be construed as an act dangerous to human life (although it needn’t be, given the authorities themselves concede that there is no grave/immediate threat). The occupation is also a violation of the law occurring within the United States.

However, there are many acts which meet these initial criteria—for instance jaywalking (potentially dangerous, illegal, and occurring within U.S. borders). The real *meat* of what counts as terrorism relates to intent, as defined in point 3. And the actions of the Bundy militia do not meet any of these components:

1. The Bundys are very explicitly not trying to intimidate or coerce a civilian population. They have made no demands of the public, the public can come and go largely unrestricted even in the Refuge itself (although the government advises against this). Moreover, their expressed grievances enjoy wide public support in the area, as reporting has unanimously demonstrated, even among people who want them to leave. But much of the public actually supports their demonstration as well. Finally, the militia has said it will vacate the facilities if it seems clear that this is what most of the public wants. In short, the actions of the militia do not meet point (i) of component 3.
2. The Bundys are not attempting to influence government policy by intimidation or coercion. Again, they have political objectives, from re-negotiating land rights in the West, to securing the release of the Hammonds. However, they have been very explicit that they will not carry out violence or destruction simply because their demands are not met. Instead, they will simply continue their demonstration.
   In the meantime, they are taking care not to damage the facility they are occupying. They are not denying the public or employees access to the site (although many are choosing not to go due to the occupation). There is no account that they used their firearms to seize the facility (for instance, by pointing them at people and telling them to leave), so they did not use violence or any explicit threat of violence to establish their demonstration either. That is, their weapons are not to be used in the service of their political objectives. As a result, the militia does not meet point (ii) of component 3.
3. The militia has carried out no assassinations, kidnapping or mass destruction—nor have they threatened to engage in these under any circumstances—so point (iii) of component 3 is totally immaterial to this discussion.

In virtue of not satisfying conditions related to point 3, the militia is not engaged in terrorism. Now, the militia has declared that they will reciprocate violence if initiated by the government, but this is also not terrorism. First, and foremost because it is incidental to their political objectives (attempting to prevent the government from initiating violence against them has nothing to do with freeing the Hammonds, adjusting federal land rights, etc.). In order to read the statute sufficiently broadly to count the militia as committing terrorism for threatening reciprocal violence, virtually any act of resisting arrest, particularly by a political dissident, could be construed as terrorism.

Are the committing crimes? Yes, lots of them. Indeed, that is the point of civil disobedience. Are they committing terrorism? Absolutely not.

The issue isn’t their act of civil disobedience, but that they are armed.

This line of argument was common, and I found it perplexing:

Right to assemble? Great. Civil disobedience? No problem. Freedom of speech? Of course. Freedom of conscience? Yes, despite their often grotesque beliefs. Right to bear arms? Sure, they have it. But somehow, when you practice all of these at the same time, it morphs into terrorism. That is, the militia’s exercise of their other rights would be perfectly fine were they not simultaneously exercising their 2nd Amendment rights. This seems like a non-sequitur to me.

Another variation of this objection is that civil disobedience is “unarmed” by definition. This assertion is simply false. I cited the example of the Black Panthers in the piece, and they are hardly the only example. In fact, virtually all successful social movements, throughout history and anywhere in the world, were reliant on coercion—and typically violence—in order to realize their objectives. I spelled this out in my first article with Salon, “There is no social change without coercion.”

How would they respond if YOU showed up and wanted to join them?
or, I guess I’ll just invade your house as a political demonstration and see if you would call me a terrorist.

In response to question 1, the militia would LOVE it if I offered to join them. As a black person and a Muslim, I would be a token two-fer. They’d likely make me one of the prominent faces/voices of the demonstration, because it would disarm the whole white guys/racism stuff, and also the double-standard talk. Realistically, that is how they would respond if I showed up and wanted to volunteer, standard MO for these groups. But of course, I would not join them, as I disagree with many of their espoused views. But again, they do not become terrorists in virtue of this disagreement, nor does it mean they should be responded to with violence.

In response to question 2, I wouldn’t view them as terrorists. That doesn’t mean I wouldn’t want the occupiers gone, or even that I wouldn’t want the state to work to achieve this outcome. But I wouldn’t want them to achieve it at the expense of a massacre against the occupiers, etc. As a matter of fact, one of the people occupying the Refuge (Jon Ritzheimer) tried to organize an armed demonstration at my mosque in Tucson, AZ.

As I laid out very clearly in other pieces for Salon (for instance, “Pamela Gellar is no Rosa Parks“), just because a particular demonstration is (or should be) protected doesn’t make it ethical or responsible; similarly, just because an act is provocative doesn’t make it brave, intelligent, or productive. Finally, just as some citizens have a right to protest, others have a right to challenge them. It was on these grounds that I was very forward in speaking out against Ritzheimer’s plan–and in part due to organization and resistance by local Muslims, and support from the broader Tucson community, the rally did not happen. And to be sure, we were all relieved at this outcome. However, at no point did I view his actions as terrorism. Nor did I call for a violent clampdown against him or his supporters. Because I actually believe in freedom of speech, conscience, assembly, etc.—and I believe it is the role of the government to protect these rights, not to undermine them. The specific contents of one’s beliefs, etc. are generally irrelevant to this.

I am somewhat dismayed, although not particularly surprised, that more liberals are not on board–especially given their rhetoric about diversity, tolerance, non-conformance, freedom for “dangerous ideas,” etc. Perhaps Alain Badiou put it best:

“What then becomes of [ethics] should we claim to suppress or mask its religious character, all the while preserving the abstract arrangement of its apparent constitution? The answer is obvious: a dog’s dinner. We are left with a pious discourse without piety, a spiritual supplement for incompetent governments, and a cultural sociology preached, in line with the new-style sermons, in lieu of the late class struggle.

Our suspicions are first aroused when we see that the self-declared apostles of ethics and of the ‘right to difference’ are clearly horrified by any vigorously-sustained difference. For them, African customs are barbaric, Muslims are dreadful, the Chinese are totalitarian, and so on. As a matter of fact, this celebrated ‘other’ is acceptable only if he is a good other—which is to say what, exactly, if not the same as us?

Respect for differences? Of course! But on the condition that the different be parliamentary-democratic, pro free-market economics, in favor of freedom of opinion, feminism, and the environment…even immigrants in this country [France], as seen by partisans of ethics, are acceptably different only when they are ‘integrated,’ only if they seek integration (which seems to mean, if you think about it: only if they want to suppress their difference). It might well be that ethical ideology, detached from the religious teachings which at least conferred upon it the fullness of a ‘revealed’ identity, is simply the final imperative of a conquering civilization: ‘Become like me and I will respect your difference.’”

From, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil (p. 24-5).

That said, it was stunning how many readers suggested that I should be treated as a terrorist sympathizer, that is, that the national security apparatus should be turned on me, simply for suggesting that it not be turned on others. Champions of free-thinking, indeed.

Common narratives/ the big picture

Undergirding most objections to the article, there seem to be a few big issues:

First, many readers are uncomfortable with the state of gun control in America, and really don’t feel like anyone should have military weaponry, or possibly not any kind of firearms.
But the reality is, their guns are legal, as is their open-carrying of those weapons. The second amendment provides for the right to bear arms, explicitly for the purposes of maintaining militias. And as is clear from history and the writings of the founding fathers, these militias were viewed as serving two essential, albeit somewhat contradictory, purposes:

Of course, the second amendment is not incompatible with reasonably regulating the sale, distribution or use of firearms–but again, by all evidence the militia is compliant with existing statutes regulating firearms. Readers uncomfortable with these rules can work to change them, but this has nothing to do with whether or not Bundy and his militia are terrorists.

Second, many readers view the ideologies of Bundy et al. as repugnant and possibly dangerous. I broadly agree with this, as I make it clear throughout this article and other works (many of which were linked to in the piece).
But holding views which I find to be bigoted, ignorant, or otherwise offensive is not, nor should it be, a crime. Accordingly, their views should not serve as the pretext for violence against the militia. Again, there are some who hold similar views to these militants and ARE a more substantial threat. But this makes it all the more important to avoid bandying around terrorism in a sloppy fashion:
Inflating the danger of people like Bundy obscures, distracts attention from, and diverts resources from more pressing challenges to public security, order, or the common good. Worse, it can lead to radicalizing targeted groups, turning them into real dangers—bringing about the very outcomes (i.e. terrorism) that people are ostensibly hoping to avoid. That is why, even setting aside the moral considerations, just from a pragmatic point of view, the best thing to do is to wait them out.

Third,  many readers seemed particularly uncomfortable with the conjunction of (1) and (2): individuals holding extreme or unpleasant views who are also heavily armed. But again, neither 1 nor 2 are crimes, nor are they constitutive of terrorism.

Here’s the bottom line, as I see it: if the post-9/11 national security apparatus is ill-formed and overreaching, then we all should be working to dismantle it, not to turn it against other people (i.e. our ideological/political rivals). This is why despite being an African American and a Muslim (indeed, precisely because I have been on the wrong side of these witch-hunts), I find no joy in seeing Ammon Bundy and his militia labeled as terrorists. They are not terrorists, regardless of the myriad other negative things that could more legitimately be said about them.