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Category: Analyses

  • Police in America Are Out of Control

    Police in America Are Out of Control

    Following the killing of George Floyd and the subsequent wave of protests nationwide (indeed, worldwide) against police brutality, Americans have witnessed video after video of cops assaulting unarmed demonstrators, and even complete bystanders unlucky enough to cross their path.

    In one striking case, police senselessly shoved a seventy-five-year-old man to the ground, causing blood to pour out of his ears and giving him a brain injury. This incident occurred just one day after cops from that same department, in that same spot, knelt in solidarity with those protesting excessive use of force. To make matters worse, authorities then falsely reported that the man merely ‘tripped and fell.’ Inconveniently for them, a video of the incident went viral, forcing everyone to reckon with the truth.

    Many try to explain away cases like these as “isolated incidents” carried out by “bad apples” who are unrepresentative of most law enforcement nationwide. Apologists insist that that the media promotes an “anti-police narrative” that neglects the dangers cops face on the job (dangers that, apparently, justify the levels of force they deploy). The available empirical data on violence and policing, though, presents a more complex and troubling picture. If anything, most public discussions may be too narrow and myopic to capture how extreme, pervasive, and multifaceted police abuse of power actually is.  

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  • Why Reflexivity is Important for Research and Activism

    Why Reflexivity is Important for Research and Activism

    In a recent essay for Public Seminar, I explored Amy Cooper’s attempts to sic police on a black man for telling her to leash her dog. I argued that her actions should not be understood as novel or surprising, and explained how her likely (liberal) sociopolitical orientation may have contributed to how the confrontation played out:

    In general, whites and socioeconomic elites in America feel a greater sense of entitlement and belonging, and a stronger conviction that social institutions exist to serve them and promote their interests. Within these groups, progressives are much more likely than conservatives to view various forms of state intervention as the ideal means of addressing problems. As compared to men, women are more likely to rely on authorities to exercise aggression – particularly in conflicts against males. As a result of broader cultural shifts over the last few decades, contemporary adults are more likely to rely on bureaucrats, administrators and other authorities to resolve interpersonal disputes than people have been in previous generations.  

    At the other end of these spectra, those who skew older, conservative and/or male are more likely to resort to direct confrontation during attempts to enforce the racial order — including veritable lynchings (such as occurred with Ahmaud Arbery), ‘self-defense’ killings, mass shootings and incidents of outright terrorism.

    That is, the specific form of racial aggression that Amy Cooper exhibited is typical of a very particular stratum of American society – from the involvement of authorities in an interpersonal dispute (and under the left-typical assumption that cops are racially-biased), to the politically-correct evocation of race throughout the confrontation (‘African American’), to the feigned distress during the phone call with police dispatchers (evoking gendered and racialized stereotypes in order to provoke a more rapid and forceful response). It all came effortlessly and automatically. Even though she grew up in Canada, Ms. Cooper was able to deploy the social scripts of white American elites like a pro (which is not too surprising, as she has been attending elite schools and performing elite jobs in the U.S. for well over a decade).   

    Anyone who occupies a similar socio-cultural position to Amy Cooper has similar scripts available to them — and could behave in a similar manner if they were to find themselves in an altercation with a black person. And as I highlighted, they regularly do. Consequently, the pearl-clutching about Ms. Cooper’s behavior among her peers, the attempts to pathologize her as especially depraved or immoral – these seem like attempts by other social elites to convince themselves (and others) that they are somehow different from her. The reality of the situation, I argued, is much more uncomfortable.

    My essay on Amy Cooper was the conclusion of a series. Previously, for The Baffler, I highlighted how the lifestyles of the professional-managerial class are fundamentally premised on the undercompensated labor of desperate and vulnerable ‘disposable people.’ The rub, of course, is that most of those who participate in this exploitation are members of what economist Thomas Piketty aptly named the ‘Brahmin Left’ : highly-educated, ‘culturally liberal,’ staunch advocates of diversity and inclusion, environmentally-conscious, healthy-living, technocratically-inclined people, committed to ‘doing well while doing good.’ Increasingly, as Piketty notes, these people have come to associate themselves with the Democratic Party (and, in his telling, have largely ‘captured’ the DNC’s agenda).

    In the Chronicle of Higher Education, I extended this analysis to look at institutions of higher learning – demonstrating how the lifestyles of contemporary tenured and tenure-track professors are predicated upon the production and exploitation of ‘disposable scholars.’ Here again, the irony is that academics today skew overwhelmingly left and tend to be among the most aggressive critics of inequality in society writ large.

    For Contexts, I demonstrated that many fashionable definitions of racism and antiracist activism seem to be out of step with attitudes and priorities of most people of color — and may even be pernicious to those they are supposed to help. However, these approaches do seem to advance the interests of liberal elites, who play an outsized role in defining racism in academia, the media and the broader culture.

    Some common themes run throughout these four pieces : a focus on elites, liberals, academics and journalists — and how members of these groups often perpetuate and reinforce racialized inequality,  sometimes in the name of antiracism,  apparently oblivious to how their own lifestyles and behaviors are related to the problems they are ostensibly committed to eliminating.

    Here, I would like to briefly clarify the ‘point’ of these works. I’ll begin by emphasizing what I was not trying to say.

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  • ‘Karen’ is a Democrat

    ‘Karen’ is a Democrat

    Amy Cooper was asked to put her pet on a leash, in accordance with city ordinance. Rather than simply complying with the rules, Ms. Cooper tried to sic the police on the person who pointed out her violation – feigning to be in imminent danger from an ‘African American man.’  Fortunately, the man accused of threatening Ms. Cooper recorded the incident. His sister later uploaded the video to social media, where it went viral; it has already been viewed tens of millions of times.  

    She then called 911 a second time after she was away from Mr. Cooper, alleging that he had tried to assault her, and demanding that the cops take immediate action.

    It is unclear what the appropriate consequences for something like this should be, given how dire the consequences of her actions could have been (as recent events in Minneapolis sadly confirm). However, Ms. Cooper has already paid a high price for her transgression: she has been publicly shamed and branded a ‘Karen.’ She has been terminated from her position as a VP and Head of Investment Solutions at Franklin Templeton Investments. She has surrendered custody of her dog (whom she dragged around by the neck for most of the confrontation). Some lawmakers have called for her to be charged with making a false report to police.

    A lot of ink has been spilled over this incident and others like it. One thing that has been largely missing from these stories is the political orientation of the white people who behave in this manner. It may be tempting to view this question as a distraction from the ‘core’ issue at hand – however, I will argue, this component may actually be essential for understanding how many of these stories play out.

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  • Who Defines What ‘Racist’ Means ?

    Who Defines What ‘Racist’ Means ?

    One key insight of the “discursive turn” in social research is that how concepts are defined, and by whom, reveals a lot about power relations within a society or culture. These definitions are not just reflections of social dynamics, but can have important socio-political consequences downstream: they can help legitimize or delegitimize individuals, groups and their actions; they can render some things more easily comprehensible and others less so; they can push certain things outside the realm of polite discussion, and introduce new elements into the language game.

    The term “racist” is no exception.

    In the past, “racism” primarily denoted overt discrimination, bigotry or racial animus. Incidents of this nature are far less common today, and far less accepted, than they were in previous decades. Indeed, in contemporary U.S. society, one of the very worst charges that can be leveled against someone – especially a white person – is to accuse them of being racist.  

    On balance, both of these developments are great.  

    However, as a function of the increased social capital at stake when accusations of racism are made, and the diminishing opportunities to leverage that capital by “calling out” obvious cases of racism – the sphere of what counts as “racist” has been ever-expanding – to the point where it is now possible to qualify as “racist” on the basis of things like microaggressions and implicit attitudes.  One particularly unfortunate aspect of this concept creep – justified under the auspices of empowering people of color – is that relatively well-off, highly-educated, liberal whites tend to be among the most zealous in identifying and prosecuting these new forms of “racism.”  

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  • The Sacred Project of American Sociology

    The Sacred Project of American Sociology

    What is sociology “about?” According to the American Sociological Association (ASA), it is:

    “The study of society, a social science involving the study of the social lives of people, groups and societies; the study of our behavior as social beings, covering everything from the analysis of short contacts between anonymous individuals on the street to the study of global processes; the scientific study of social aggregations, the entities through which humans move throughout their lives; an overarching unification of all studies of humankind, including history, psychology and economics.”

    The problem with this definition, according to Note Dame sociologist (and HxA member) Christian Smith, is that it focuses on what sociologists do, but says nothing about the purposes or ends for doing these things -– i.e. “we perform these activities in order to…”  This conveys the impression that there perhaps is no overarching mission that defines the discipline, or that sociological methods and theories inform a diverse array of projects. Smith argues that while this impression is at least superficially true, it is also misleading. “Sociology has at a deep level become, to use Harold Rosenberg’s apt phrase, ‘a herd of independent minds’” (p. 146).

    What Smith has in mind here is not homogeneity along political, ideological, or even moral lines – at least not in the conventional sense. Sociology is not fundamentally “about” advancing particular politicians, parties, policies, ideas, or behaviors. Nor is it a “grievance discipline” oriented around critiquing the prevailing order — such a characterization misses the point of sociological critique, which is in the service of a positive project. And not just any project, but a sacred and spiritual one.

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  • Disposable Scholars

    Disposable Scholars

    Crises, such as the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, often serve to clarify the state of the societies and institutions they impact – highlighting dynamics which have long been present but have previously gone unnoticed or underdiscussed. Higher ed is no exception. At colleges and universities nationwide, institutional responses to the coronavirus pandemic highlight just how much the ordinary lifestyles of tenured faculty are premised on the production and exploitation of ‘disposable scholars.’

    The 2020 cohort of PhDs is facing a nearly non-existent job market. But of course, even prior to the coronavirus pandemic, most graduating PhDs faced bleak prospects. National Science Foundation data suggest that 40% of recent PhD graduates had no employment commitments of any kind (not in the private sector, nor as post docs nor as contingent or tenure-track faculty). Of those who did get commitments in academe, tenure-track appointments were relatively rare.

    According to the AAUP, nearly three-fourths of all teaching jobs today are not tenure-eligible. As a new report by the American Federation of Teachers highlights, these non-tenure track jobs tend to provide relatively low wages, few benefits, and little job security – with contracts extended or retracted fairly capriciously from semester to semester. At more prestigious institutions, growing numbers are expected to literally work for free. An association with a top-tier university, a line on one’s CV, and the vague prospect of eventually being converted into a paid position are held to be sufficient renumeration. As a function of these tendencies, many contingent faculty have to rely on government assistance to make ends meet. Most are also saddled by high levels of debt, incurred in the hope that a terminal degree would provide a pathway to a stable and well-compensated academic job.

    Contingent faculty have very little academic freedom – as I discovered first-hand in my previous role at the University of Arizona. In my case, it was the willful mischaracterization of my political and religious views by a Fox News contributor that served as the catalyst for being dropped. However, schools will cut contingent faculty for almost any reason. They will eliminate them without hesitation in order to placate angry mobs or trustees – whether the attacks come from the right or the left. A single bad teaching review can result in one’s contract not being renewed, driving many to inflate grades. A disagreement with a tenured faculty member can result in the same, leading most to keep their heads down in interactions with professors. Contingent faculty generally have no right to vote on departmental issues, although they must live with committee decisions. And once on the contingent faculty track, it is difficult to get off.


    Many appeal to fiscal pressures brought about by the 2008 financial crisis, or to the broader neoliberalization of higher ed, to explain the growing proportion of contingent versus tenure-eligible faculty at colleges and universities nationwide. The problem with these accounts is that they fail to explain why departments continue to produce PhDs at a rate that far eclipses the number of faculty opportunities available. Why do departments consistently admit far more students than they could plausibly place?

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  • The Crisis of Expertise

    The Crisis of Expertise

    There has been a lot of talk in recent years about the “war on science” or the so-called “death of expertise.” However, according to the General Social Survey, there has been no radical decrease with respect to public trust in the scientific community per se. 

    Crisis of Expertise 1

    In fact, contemporary Americans have more trust in the scientific community than any other social institution besides the military. While medicine and education have seen declines in public confidence over the last several decades (more on the latter soon) – they are still more trusted than any branch of the government, not to mention organized religion, corporations, and the media.

    Crisis of Expertise 2

    There has been no decrease in public perceptions about the value of scientific research. Instead, confidence in the benefits of science is up slightly as compared to the late 80s through 90s.

    Crisis of Expertise 3

    Relative to other countries, the National Science Foundation (NSF) notes:

    “Most survey respondents in other countries also generally report strong belief in the value of science, although these beliefs appear to be somewhat higher in the United States” (emphasis mine).

    That is, Americans tend to have more faith in science than most others worldwide. Yet we also see dramatic polarization around issues like climate change, GMOs, vaccines, the interrelationships between biology and various human characteristics or behaviors, etc. We see frequent disparagement of experts. On the left, when researchers strike inconvenient conclusions, they are often accused of being corrupted by material interests of those funding the work, or of being under the sway of moral pathologies (racism, sexism, transphobia, etc.). On the right, the accusation is that the researchers are elitists and ideologues trying to advance a particular social and political agenda.  That is, there seems to be high, bipartisan faith in science and the scientific community in general, and simultaneously, widespread concern about experts’ socio-political and ideological alignments, and how these may color their interpretations of scientific findings on particular issues.

    An excellent new book by Columbia sociologist Gil Eyal sheds light on what is going on here:

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  • What Coronavirus Reveals About the Lifestyles of the Professional-Managerial Class

    What Coronavirus Reveals About the Lifestyles of the Professional-Managerial Class

    In New York City and throughout the country, the professional-managerial class is hunkered down and making the best of a bad situation: working remotely, enjoying time with their families, making sure their children stay up on their schoolwork, finding ways to work out, exercising self-care, and catching up on all the shows they’ve wanted to binge-watch.

    This could be told as a story about the wonders of technology and capitalism. Social media, communication platforms, delivery services, and streaming entertainment make life under quarantine more bearable and productive.  But such a narrative would miss the main story.

    Consider the stay-at-home shopper’s lifeline, Amazon.com: orders are translated into parcels that arrive at one’s doorstep thanks to tens of thousands of fulfillment center workers—disproportionately people of color—who, even under normal circumstances, work under immense strain and deplorable conditions. The packages are then transported to metropolitan hubs by undercompensated truckers. They ultimately arrive at one’s home by means of overburdened post office workers and delivery contractors.  

    Or, think about food delivery. To receive prepared food, whether the orders are called in to a restaurant or placed through an app like GrubHub or DoorDash, “back of the house” restaurant workers must be on duty to prepare the meal. These workers are also disproportionately people of color, often undocumented immigrants, and typically paid poorly. Receiving groceries at home through platforms like Instacart similarly requires an army of poorly compensated workers to process orders and the gather merchandise. In either case, delivering the food is grueling, high-pressure work; deliverers are exposed daily to road hazards, the elements and, occasionally, predation. Wages tend to be very low and benefits nonexistent. Within urban areas, the people filling these jobs are disproportionately immigrants and minorities.

    That is to say, the relative ease and comfort that many in the professional-managerial class are experiencing during the pandemic—ostensibly a result of digital platforms like Amazon, InstaCart or GrubHub—is actually the product of thousands of low-paid “invisible” workers who are paying the costs, and exposing themselves to considerable risk, on behalf of those who are better off.  

    Of course, in the midst of the pandemic these workers may also want to spend time with their families, or ensure their kids stay up on schoolwork. They may want to indulge in self-care or to stream their favorite shows. But that’s not an option for many of these low-income laborers. They cannot afford to stop working, even if they are concerned about health implications of continuing to show up. Even if they are worried about spreading the illness to elderly relatives who often live with them. Even if they are showing symptoms of infection.   

    The recently passed Families First Coronavirus Response Act, which became law a week before the $2 trillion stimulus bill was signed by the president last Friday, provides two weeks of paid leave for workers who are sick or whose children are out of school. However, it exempts those who work for large companies (like McDonald’s and Amazon) or for some small businesses (like local restaurants) and many classified as self-employed (like gig workers)—ensuring that these laborers will continue risking their health to provide necessary services so relatively well-off American citizens can continue to comfortably shelter in place.

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  • On Heterodox Academy and Effective Advocacy

    On Heterodox Academy and Effective Advocacy

    I began working with Heterodox Academy in the fall of 2016, about a year after the group was formed. At that time, the organization (such as it was) was a handful of interesting people who met in Jon Haidt’s NYU office every week to talk about current events, ideas for blog posts and external publications, and to touch base on projects different team members were working on.

    Things quickly changed:

    The ‘surprise’ outcome of the 2016 election – and the shock, horror and terror that many left-leaning faculty and students felt in the aftermath – made the task of encouraging ideological diversity much more challenging. Granted, if anything, the election showed a growing disconnect in America between highly-educated elites and everyone else. The need for higher ed institutions to foreground viewpoint diversity, mutual understanding and constructive disagreement was perhaps never greater. Yet, for many – in that moment — the idea of platforming and engaging civilly and in good-faith with, say, conservative or Christian views… this seemed to be too much to ask, too much for them to bear.

    Exacerbating this sense were coordinated campaigns by right-aligned actors to troll distraught students by inviting inflammatory figures to campus. Too often, organizers got the reactions they were looking for — leading to more notoriety, and invitations to more campuses, for these speakers. Disinvitations spiked to record levels. There were high-profile altercations at Middlebury, Evergreen, Berkeley and other schools. This led to major partisan polarization with respect to perceptions about colleges and universities. There was a sharp rise in faculty fired for political speech-related issues – often following after Fox News witch hunts against professors accused of corrupting the youth. This cycle of provocation, overreaction and escalation continued for nearly two years — culminating with the killing of Heather Heyer in the aftermath of clashes at UVA.

    We recognized that Heterodox Academy needed to get a lot more organized, to approach these challenges far more systematically, and to address them at a much larger scale. In January 2018, Deb Mashek was hired to be our inaugural executive director. Her first order of business was to add “organs” to the organization. We became a 501c3. We began tracking metrics to evaluate our membership and our impact. We conducted member surveys, and a listening tour at different types of institutions nationwide, to hear from various stakeholders what they wanted or needed from us. We began building out the team and expanding our tools, resources and interventions.  Shortly into this process, I was appointed to head up communications for the organization.

    Over my time with HxA – especially my nearly two years in this role – I have been blown away by many scholars’ courage, commitment and intellectual humility, by their willingness to engage patiently and in good faith even with views they strongly disagree with, their willingness to change their minds about things when presented with compelling arguments and evidence, and so much more. Both working with us, and on their own, scholars across the U.S. and beyond have launched research collaborations, working groups and events; they have developed pedagogical innovations; members have sought out ways to better integrate heterodoxy into everything from course syllabi, to job ads, to non-discrimination and diversity statements, to how they approach institutional service and pedagogy; they have been making their case to their colleagues and other academic stakeholders through public talks, publications and social media engagement.  And progress is being made — both in local contexts and in the broader milieu — as a result of their initiative, bravery, hard work and perseverance.

    Engaging with, and learning from, these colleagues has been a joy and a privilege. I feel much more optimistic about the state of higher ed than I did when I began this work. To be sure, the challenges colleges and universities face with respect to ensuring students and scholars can freely express and explore ideas, that the processes of admissions, hiring and promotion are as rigorous, fair and inclusive as possible, that research and teaching is not systematically distorted by scholars’ own identity and ideological commitments – these are not small issues. As I have indicated elsewhere, it will likely be a fairly protracted campaign. But I am confident that faculty, administrators and students will ultimately rise to the occasion.

    Hence, it is bittersweet to be stepping back from my day-to-day work with Heterodox Academy in order to better focus on my research and my obligations at Columbia University. In my last essay here for the foreseeable future, I would like to offer some parting observations about pitfalls viewpoint diversity advocates often fall into, and advice on how to avoid them:

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  • Bloomberg Won’t Win. Sanders Could.

    Bloomberg Won’t Win. Sanders Could.

    Joe Biden seems to think that Democrats are really well positioned for 2020, recently arguing “We could run Mickey Mouse against this president and have a shot.”

    The rest of us aren’t so sure:

    According to a recent Pew Research Center poll, a plurality (48%) of Americans want Trump to be unseated in 2020. Yet only a quarter of respondents believe that Democrats will be able to pull this off. Count me among that group who wants Trump to lose but believes that he’ll win. This is (in)famously where I came down in 2016. 2020 seems like it may shape up as more of the same.

    No matter who they nominate, the election will be something of a longshot for Democrats. When a party takes the White House, they almost always stay there for at least 8 years. Going all the way back to the Civil War, the only true exception to this pattern is Jimmy Carter.

    Public dissatisfaction with the direction things are going, low approval ratings, etc. — these only matter when the opposition puts forward an alternative that people actually like and believe in. It can’t be someone who is just marginally less terrible: presented with a choice between the “the lesser of two evils” the public tends to stick with “the devil they know.” As a result of the “default effect,” what matters most isn’t how the public feels about the incumbent, but how they feel about the challenger.  

    For Jimmy Carter, the problem wasn’t just that he was unpopular (other candidates were less popular and won reelection, like Truman). He had the misfortune of running against Ronald Reagan. “The Gipper” was charismatic, trusted and liked by many. He had an ambitious vision and inspirational rhetoric.  He wanted to shake up the system. For this, Republican gatekeepers tried to stop him in 1980 (as they had successfully done in 1976). The media, and some of his rivals, argued he was too old. Party technocrats claimed the math didn’t work out on his plans – branding them ‘voodoo economics.’ The opposition party cheered at Reagan’s eventual nomination, believing he was too far to the right to be electable in the general. Instead, he notched two consecutive landslide victories and fundamentally reshaped the Republican Party in his image.

    Bernie Sanders is obviously the closest thing to a left-wing (antidote to) Ronald Reagan — and he has emerged as the Democratic frontrunner in national polls, just as voting is kicking off. He swept the popular vote in both rounds of the (chaotic) Iowa caucuses, won New Hampshire, and absolutely dominated the Nevada caucuses – ending up more than 25 percentage points above his next closest rival. According to FiveThirtyEight he currently has a 50/50 shot at getting enough votes to close the deal on his nomination without a (divisive) brokered convention. He has the lowest unfavourability rating of any Democratic contender.

    This is all good news, right? Apparently not:

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  • Students are Ideologically Diverse. Here’s How to Surface that Diversity.

    Students are Ideologically Diverse. Here’s How to Surface that Diversity.

    It has long been a talking point on the right that leftist professors are ‘indoctrinating’ college kids (an elaboration on why many quite reasonably hold this belief is available here). However, a number of recent studies suggest that this narrative is incorrect: students can reliably determine what their professors’ political beliefs are, and when they detect that instructors hold alignments that diverge from their own, they often respond with lower teaching evaluations, etc. That is, rather than passively absorbing a professors’ beliefs, students react against them.

    Of course, there are some instructors who try to utilize their classrooms in order to push a particular sociopolitical agenda — a line of thought that goes back to Gramsci and was popularized by Paolo Friere, bell hooks and others. However, as is frequently bemoaned in the ‘critical pedagogy’ literature (e.g. here, here, here, here, here), college students widely resist these efforts by instructors. Consequently, undergraduates’ political alignments and affiliations tend to not move much over the course of their college careers. Conservatives generally continue to be conservatives, liberals tend to remain liberals. That is, even when professors are trying to indoctrinate students, they aren’t very good at it.

    This is all very much in keeping with a new book by Hugo Mercier, Not Born Yesterday, which illustrates how most attempts at mass persuasion and indoctrination fail – be they by advertisers, political leaders, religious leaders or college professors. Why? Simply put: contrary to some popular narratives, most people are not gullible, naïve, or stupid. They recognize when others are trying to mislead them or manipulate them for their own purposes – and they often respond negatively to such attempts.

    As I’ve explained elsewhere, people concerned about teachers pushing their views on students should probably be focused on ed schools and K-12. This is where the action is these days: targeting students whose intellectual immune systems are not fully developed. By the time students get to college, they are not particularly susceptible to being ‘indoctrinated.’

    And frankly, most college professors are not actually trying to ‘brainwash’ students to begin with. They may often inadvertently present an incomplete or biased view on many topics, but that is a very different (and much more tractable) issue. Indeed, Heterodox Academy is comprised overwhelmingly of centrist and left-leaning professors who are committed to improving their own teaching and research, and to helping colleagues do the same.

    Apparent Homogeneity Can Be Misleading

    At most universities nationwide, students are actually much more politically heterogenous than the faculty or (especially) university admin. In my experience, there are a couple reasons we observe an apparent homogeneity of views on various issues:

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  • Positionality and Homogeneity in Social Research: Towards a Holistic Exploration

    Positionality and Homogeneity in Social Research: Towards a Holistic Exploration

    Callosal disconnection syndrome, more colloquially known as ‘split brain syndrome’ occurs when the connections between the left and right hemispheres of the brain are disrupted or severed. The condition often makes it difficult for people to fully access and synthesize various flows of information or to properly coordinate their actions. This is, perhaps, a perfect metaphor for the viewpoint diversity movement up to now.   

    In a previous essay, “Seizing the Means of Knowledge Production,” I demonstrated that despite the perceived novelty of the current moment in higher education, in fact there is little that is actually new: debates around ‘grievance studies’ ‘victimhood culture,’ ‘social justice,’ affirmative action, sensitivity training, safe spaces, institutional racism, microaggressions, social constructionism, cultural appropriation, critical race theory, intersectionality, words as violence, white privilege, trigger warnings – you name it – they all go back decades. These concepts and approaches were institutionalized gradually by a constellation of scholars, practitioners and activists who well-understood how colleges and universities operate, and executed a series of disciplined, grassroots – largely successful — campaigns to transform institutional policies, practices and culture.

    Interestingly, the viewpoint diversity movement dates back just as far as any of these concepts. Following the 1900 political firing of Stanford sociologist Edward A. Ross, the nascent AAUP and AACU helped establish robust protections for academic freedom. However, it quickly became clear that protecting faculty from outside political pressure was not enough: scholarship could also be censored or corrupted by the ideological and identity commitments of professors themselves.

    Indeed, as scholars gained increased power and autonomy with respect to things like hiring and promotion decisions, graduate admissions, what made it through institutional review boards, which work got published, curriculum design, etc. — they almost immediately began using their newfound clout to marginalize or suppress inconvenient findings and narratives (as well as the academics who produced them), and to push through work that flattered their worldview and perceived interests.

    In response, a growing number of scholars set out to document the ways that insufficient viewpoint diversity undermined research and teaching – and began lobbying for 1) a more heterogenous professoriate, and 2) richer engagement with a wider ranger of perspectives (in scholarship and pedagogy). Yet, this movement has been far less successful at institutionalizing up to now.

    Why? There are many reasons, but perhaps chief among them is that viewpoint diversity advocates quickly split into two camps – each hostile to the other. One focused on identity commitments (race, gender, sexuality, class), the other focused on ideological commitments per se (primarily political orientation and religion) and, to a lesser degree, social networks and relationships. One camp came to be associated primarily with the humanities, the other with the social sciences.

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  • Refashioning Futures: Criticism after Postcoloniality

    Refashioning Futures: Criticism after Postcoloniality

    “Political discussion possesses a character fundamentally different from academic discussion. It seeks not to be in the right, but also to demolish the basis of its opponents social and intellectual existence… Political conflict, since it is from the very beginning a rationalized form of the struggle for social predominance, attacks the social status of the opponent, his public prestige, and his self-confidence. It is difficult to decide in this case whether the sublimation or substitution of discussion for older weapons of conflict, the direct use of force and oppression, really constituted a fundamental improvement in human life. Physical repression is, it is true, harder to bear externally, but the will to psychic annihilation, which took its place in many instances, is perhaps even more unbearable…

    In political discussion in modern democracies where ideas were more clearly representative of certain groups, the social and existential determination of thought became more easily visible… political discussion is, from the very beginning, more than theoretical argumentation; it is also the tearing off of disguises – the unmasking of those unconscious motives which bind the group existence to its cultural aspirations and theoretical arguments. To the extent, however, that modern politics fought its battle with theoretical weapons, the process of unmasking penetrated to the social roots of theory…

    At first those parties which possessed the new ‘intellectual weapons,’ the unmasking of the unconscious, had a terrific advantage over their adversaries… the mere fact that it could be convincingly demonstrated to the adversary that motives which had hitherto been hidden from him were at work must have filled him with terror and awakened in the person using the weapon a feeling of marvelous superiority… today, however, we have reached a stage in which this weapon of the reciprocal unmasking and laying bare of the unconscious sources of intellectual existence has become the property not of one group among many — but all of them. In the measure that the various groups sought to destroy their adversaries’ confidence in their thinking by this modern intellectual weapon of radical unmasking, they also destroyed, as all positions gradually became subjected to analysis, man’s confidence in human thought in general.”

    If this quote seems timely given the political and cultural moment we currently find ourselves in — it is. Yet these words were put to paper nearly a century ago; they are from the opening chapter of Karl Mannheim’s 1929 Ideology and Utopia.

    Mannheim had hoped that a “free intelligentsia” which in his view were being “recruited from constantly varying social strata and life situations” could save us from this intellectual dead-end. Drawn from (and engaging with) all sectors of society, they would evaluate the facts without being lured towards ideological or utopian thinking — because collectively they would have neither an investment in the status quo nor revolutionary aspirations. They would not view themselves as a class, nor align themselves with any other socioeconomic or political faction, but rather would work to produce objective knowledge for the benefit of society as a whole.

    Today, this vision may sound quite naïve. And indeed, even in Mannheim’s time it was simply not the case that the intelligentsia were being drawn from all walks of life, from all races, creeds, genders and classes without concern for these attributes. Still today — although the knowledge production enterprise is far more inclusive than it has been in many respects — there remain dramatic over (and under) representations along the lines of race, gender, class, geography, religion, political leanings, etc. And not only is it the case that the intelligentsia continues to be drawn from a fairly narrow band of society, but contra Mannheim’s intuitions, they have come to constitute something of a class unto themselves — a ‘professional managerial class‘ — replete with their own ideologies (from meritocracy to their supposed social justice orientation) to legitimate their social position. Against those who challenge their authority, or social and cultural structures that run contrary to their aspirations, they deploy the methods of critique (Mannheim’s ‘unmasking’) — attempting to delegitimize whomever or whatever that stands in their way as racist, sexist, elitist, etc.

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  • The Media Really Is Obsessed With Donald Trump

    The Media Really Is Obsessed With Donald Trump

    Trump has an unhealthy fixation with the media. He seems to get most of his information about the world from newspapers and cable news, over and above the experts tasked with advising him. He obsesses over how he is portrayed in mainstream outlets, and regularly takes to social media to whine about the coverage in these outlets.

    It turns out that the obsession is mutual: The way the press covers Trump is quantifiably unlike any other president in modern U.S. history.

    Using a data visualization tool developed by communications scholar David Rozado (and two of his students, Mohammed Dinnunhan and Raymond Hua), I was able to graph all mentions of the terms Carter, Regan, Bush (includes H.W., W., Jeb et al.), Clinton (includes Bill, Hillary, Clinton Foundation, etc.), Obama and Trump in the New York Times, from 1975 through 2018.

    The tool presents users with three important bits of information:

    First, there is count: the total number of times the term appears in the corpus during that year. For instance, the count for “Trump” in 2018 is 93,292, meaning this word was evoked more than 93k times in the New York Times over the course of last year.

    Next, there is frequency: the result of dividing the count for a word in any given year by the total number of words in that year’s corpus (excluding non-substantive terms such as “and”, “but”, “the”, etc.). The frequency stat allows us to control for the fact that the total number of articles and words published can vary substantially across time. For instance, in 1970 the Times published far fewer articles than they do today (thanks to the internet, they can publish far more than they put to print). For this reason, the graphs below will rely on each word’s frequency rather than the count.

    In 2017, Trump’s frequency was roughly .004. That means he was directly mentioned every 250 substantive words or so—or, given the typical length of a Times piece, 2-3 times per article. This is absolutely astonishing given that this data includes every article on any topic published by the Times (including content from the sports, style, food and travel sections) — suggesting that little is published without some reference to Trump, and articles regularly mention him many, many times. The president seems to be a prism through which most other stories are filtered.

    Finally, there is rank: how often a given word is used relative to other words in the corpus for that year. For instance, the rank for “Trump” in 2018 is 4, indicating this was the 4th most-used word in the entire corpus for that year (excluding non-substantive terms). 

    For contrast, Obama, at his peak (2008), was the #9 word in the lexicon, mentioned 62k times. However, his mentions dropped off dramatically thereafter. In 2009, he slid down to #22, mentioned 48k times — and by the following year, he was rank 40, with 34k mentions. That is, looking at both presidents two years after their election, the Times talks about Trump almost 3x as much as they did Obama (our first black president).

    Even Ronald Reagan — who revolutionized the Republican Party and has become highly symbolic since –was only ranked 21 at his peak, mentioned 31k times. President Trump once bragged that he is “far greater than Ronald Reagan.” In terms of dominating the national conversation, that certainly seems to be the case:

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  • Against Reactionary and Myopic Approaches to Higher Ed Reform

    Against Reactionary and Myopic Approaches to Higher Ed Reform

    “The appeal to ‘social justice’ has by now become the most widely used and most effective argument in political discussion. Almost every claim for government action on behalf of particular groups is made in its name, and if it can be made to appear that a certain measure is demanded by ‘social justice,’ opposition to it will rapidly weaken…. It seems to be widely believed that ‘social justice’ is just a new moral value which we must add to those that were recognized in the past, and that it can be fitted within the existing framework of moral rules. What is not sufficiently recognized is that in order to give this phrase meaning a complete change of the whole character of the social order will have to be effected, and that some of the values which used to govern it will have to be sacrificed. It is such a transformation of society into one of a fundamentally different type which is currently occurring piecemeal and without awareness of the outcome to which it must lead.”

    This selection may read like something written in the post-2014 milieu – perhaps published in an outlet like Quillette – perhaps referring to ‘SJW’ students run amok. In fact, the words are more than 40 years old, taken from Hayek’s 1976 The Mirage of Social Justice.  

    How about this:

    “Leftists have helped to put together such academic disciplines as women’s history, black history, gay studies, Hispanic-American studies, and migrant studies. This has led [some] to remark that in the United States the term ‘cultural studies’ means ‘victim studies.’ [This] choice of phrase has been resented, but [it makes] a good point: namely, that such programs were created not out of the sort of curiosity about diverse forms of human life which gave rise to cultural anthropology, but rather, to do something for people who have been humiliated – to help victims of socially acceptable forms of sadism by making such sadism no longer acceptable… Nobody is setting up a program in unemployed studies, homeless studies or trailer-park studies because these people are not ‘other’ in the relevant sense. To be other in this sense you must bear an ineradicable stigma, one which makes you a victim of socially accepted sadism rather than merely economic selfishness…

    To step into the intellectual world which some of these leftists inhabit is to move out of a world where citizens of a democracy can join forces to resist sadism and selfishness into a Gothic world in which democratic politics has become a farce, in which ‘liberalism’ and ‘humanism’ are synonyms for naivete – for an inability to grasp the full horror of our situation.”

    One would be forgiven for believing this was an essay riffing on the recent ‘Grievance Studies’ hoax. In fact, the term (victim studies), and the debate surrounding these lines of research, long predated Pluckrose, Boghossian and Lindsay’s stunt. This particular passage is from Richard Rorty’s 1998 classic Achieving Our Country (published roughly 20 years prior to the ‘Sokal Squared’ affair).   

    Similarly, sociologists Bradley Campbell and Jason Manning’s 2014 paper “Microaggression and Moral Cultures” was met with great fanfare (and expanded into a book, The Rise of Victimhood Culture, in 2018) — in large part because it ostensibly explained the sudden surge of student protests in the months that preceded (and the years that followed) its publication, as well as the new language and strategies that seemed to define these demonstrations.  

    Yet well before these transformations in student protests, others had identified a change in both the valence and salience of victimhood in American culture more broadly. For instance, in 1992 conservative author Charles Skyes wrote an entire book lamenting how the United States was becoming, in his words, a “nation of victims.” In 2009, two sociologists (Fassin & Rechtman) chronicled the emergence of what Campbell & Manning would later describe as ‘victimhood culture’ in The Empire of Trauma: An Inquiry Into the Condition of Victimhood.

    Here is their story in a nutshell:

    Although the notion of psychological trauma goes back to the late 19th century (particularly via the work of Charcot, Freud and Janet) – even as late as World War II, trauma was not taken too seriously. Many argued that appeals to trauma were merely a means for soldiers to excuse their weak constitutions (unlike the ‘real men’ who could hold themselves together in war). It was widely believed that soldiers were exaggerating their symptoms in order to return home from the field, or avoid returning thereto. This widespread dismissal spurred a decades-long campaign among practitioners treating those soldiers, and veterans advocacy groups, to privilege testimony and subjective experience – to not only take these seriously, but to place them, in some senses, above meaningful scrutiny or reproach.

    Nonetheless, trauma was not widely embraced until the Vietnam War. Most intellectuals and academics were against the war. Psychologists and psychiatrists, many of whom had been formerly hesitant or skeptical of the trauma framework, increasingly sought to ground their opposition to Vietnam in their domain of expertise — by arguing that the conflict was traumatizing our nation’s young men en masse. The image of the psychologically damaged veteran became an important component of antiwar advocacy — and PTSD was formally added to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) III, following shortly after the U.S. withdrawal from the theater.

    From there, the concept was gradually expanded beyond soldiers to include civilian survivors of war and terrorism, then police officers and other first responders, then victims of crimes including (especially) sexual assault and, eventually, those who had lived through natural disasters or other catastrophes. In this process, to be a ‘victim’ or a ‘survivor’ took on less of a negative connotation – and eventually became something like a source of pride. 9/11, and the subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (and the valorization, even sacralization of those who were killed or wounded therein), played a pivotal role in this transition.

    That is, both Vietnam and 9/11 were transformative episodes. And one important way in which they were both transformative was in shifting our social and cultural understandings around things like trauma and victimhood writ large, due largely to activism by the practitioners and advocacy groups mentioned here. These new understandings of trauma and victimhood – and the corresponding elevation of subjective experience or personal interpretations – have since been exported to much of the rest of the world.

    Importantly, the ‘trauma’ construct is not uniquely informed by political considerations relative to other psychological concepts. There is an analogous story to be told about the emergence of our dominant paradigms for schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and depression, autism, extremism, etc.

    Moreover, Fassin & Rechtman’s account is not necessarily at odds with that of Campbell & Manning. However, it does tie the valorization of ‘trauma’ and ‘victimhood’ to a set of actors and issues that have not been central to these conversations up to now… perhaps because it is far more satisfying for many to lambast college kids for privileging personal experience and subjectivity, for finding pride rather than shame in their struggles, etc. than it is to target war veterans, terrorism survivors and their supporters for advocating the same – even though it was the latter, not the former, who were most central in driving this transformation. Their account also places the emergence of victimhood culture far earlier than most seem to recognize — visible well before the emergence of ‘woke’ student protests (side note: the political use of the term ‘woke’ goes back at least to 1962).

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  • Pelosi’s Impeachment Bid Will Fail

    Pelosi’s Impeachment Bid Will Fail

    On Tuesday, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi announced that a formal impeachment inquiry is going to be launched, looking into President Trump’s alleged attempts to get dirt on Joe and Hunter Biden from the Ukrainian government, among other accusations levelled against the president by a whistleblower from the U.S. intelligence community.

    Trump will definitely get impeached in the House. There will be the spectacle of a trial, but its conclusion is forgone.

    Most Democrats supported impeaching Trump even before the latest scandal broke. Indeed, there were calls to impeach before Trump even took office! This time, they will almost certainly succeed in getting their way, as many House Democrats are facing primary challenges from the left wing of the party, and will not want to come off as protecting Trump – hence, even those who have misgivings about this tactic will vote to impeach — especially now that nine out of 10 Democratic voters favor impeachment.

    Only 12 Democrats in the House continue to express skepticism about impeachment proceedings — virtually all from districts Trump carried in 2016, and nearly all of them freshmen — and the Democrats have enough votes without them.

    But it will be an almost pure party line vote. The facts of the investigation are immaterial here.

    A set of facts that matters more include the fact that most congressional districts today are not competitive – hence in a situation where the general population leans strongly one way, but the party base leans another, lawmakers will generally side with their base. For instance, if 70% of all Americans support impeachment but 70% of Republicans in their district oppose, most lawmakers would give far more weight to the second number than the first. Hence, the media focus on the overall support for impeachment loses the thread: if you want to know how the vast majority of Congresspeople will vote, look to the base.

    President Trump has sky-high approval ratings among the Republican base. This same base just saw a three-year inquiry (or “witch hunt” as the President and his supporters described it) into alleged collusion between the Trump campaign and Russia, which ended with no collusion being established. As a result, the Republicans are not going to be moved by whatever comes out in the forthcoming hearing, nor by media reporting on this issue.

    Because the Republican base will reject these charges and rally behind the President, GOP lawmakers will be hesitant to vote for impeachment either, regardless of the facts of the case. In many congressional districts, Trump enjoys far more support among Republican voters than the lawmakers representing those districts. As a result, voting to remove the President from office would be tantamount to voting themselves out of office  – with an election fast-approaching.

    Granted, we may see a few mavericks in swing districts vote for impeachment, or anti-Trump Republicans who are planning to retire anyway. Overwhelmingly, however, GOP lawmakers are going to rally behind the President. Watergate, and the wave of successful primary challenges against Republicans who broke rank and supported the investigation of Nixon, will serve as a cautionary tale for any GOP lawmakers interested in keeping their seat.

    As a result, Trump will be acquitted in the Senate. This is nothing extraordinary, however. No sitting U.S. President has ever been removed from office by Congress. A couple have been impeached in the House; the Senate is where these initiatives go to die. In this case, even if 100% of Senate Democrats and Independents voted for impeachment, they would still need at least 20 more Republicans (assuming they got all Democrats and Independents to vote for impeachment) in order to reach the required two-thirds majority to remove a sitting president. That is not going to happen.

    Sure, it is strictly speaking possible that the inquiry uncovers a fact so damning that it transcends partisan loyalty, or even causes the base to change its opinion of Trump. But I cannot imagine what such a revelation could possibly be. In a recent poll, more than 80 percent of Americans declared they were “not surprised” or “not surprised at all” by Trump’s alleged behavior on the call.

    This is precisely why Trump’s “I could stand in the middle of Fifth Avenue and shoot somebody” comments were so depressing—they were largely accurate! As one Republican congressman vividly put it:  

    “Trump has said he could stand in the middle of Fifth Avenue and shoot someone dead and and not lose any supporters. Well, if that happens I’d better be photographed stuffing a body into the trunk of a car, or my constituents will demand to know why I’m not supporting the president.”

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  • (Why) Liberal Faculty Don’t Discriminate Against Conservative Students in Grading

    (Why) Liberal Faculty Don’t Discriminate Against Conservative Students in Grading

    Many right-of-center students (especially those who are grade-obsessed) fear that their professors will punish them for their political and cultural views if they were to express them in class discussions or assignments – and choose to self-censor instead.

    It’s easy to understand why they are concerned: there is a significant lack of ideological diversity among the professoriate; in social research fields, the left-to-right ratio is roughly 10:1. Professors rarely assign readings by conservative or libertarian intellectuals on the syllabus, let alone engaging with these thinkers in a charitable way. Faculty regularly make off-topic jabs at Trump or the Republicans, or even end up diverging into full-on rants. Even professors who are moderate and charitable in the classroom often put out highly political public-facing essays and social media posts — and regularly demonstrate clear antipathy towards Republicans and conservatives therein. And all of this is amplified, and often distorted, by an outrage-driven media industry.

    But do liberal faculty actually demonstrate bias in grading?

    A recent study examined the backgrounds, affiliations, and institutional perceptions of more than 7,200 undergraduate students at colleges nationwide found that liberal students do tend to have closer relationships with faculty than conservative students (commensurate with previous research). Moreover, there was a gap between the grades assigned to liberal students as opposed to conservative ones – a difference that persisted even after controlling for things like race, gender, socioeconomic status and SAT scores. However, the gap was very small: less than one-tenth of a point on a 4-point scale (i.e. less than the difference between a 3.0 and 3.1 GPA). That is, professors may be slightly biased in grading, but they do not seem to be severely punishing or rewarding undergraduates on the basis of their political leanings.

    This may be a surprising finding – not the least because there iscompelling evidence that professors and administrators do engage in ideological discrimination with respect to PhD admissions, peer review, institutional review boards, faculty hiring and promotion, etc. So what’s up with grading? Is the issue that we just haven’t been measuring grading bias well enough? Perhaps accusations of bias overblown across the board? Or is there reason to suspect that faculty are actually less likely to ideologically discriminate against undergraduates than other groups?

    It’s likely the latter. Let me explain:

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  • There’s No Reason to Be Smug About the Partisan Diploma Divide

    There’s No Reason to Be Smug About the Partisan Diploma Divide

    “We were laughing at the stars while our feet clung tight to the ground — so pleased with ourselves for using so many verbs and nouns…”

    Modest Mouse, “Black Cadillacs,” Good News for People Who Love Bad News

    Dr. Amir Attaran, a professor of Law and Medicine at University of Ottawa recently set off a social media firestorm by describing Conservatives as the ‘party of the uneducated.’

    Facing backlash, Dr. Attaran subsequently denied affiliation with any political party, and claimed to be merely conveying what the ‘data’ says. Yet his remarks were clearly intended as disparaging. Their implication: Conservatives are less rational or informed than other voters. As if to alleviate any doubt about this subtext, Dr. Attaran went on to explicitly state that the lack of education among these voters is ‘why conservative governments offer numbskull policy,’ even as he condescendingly dismissed critics as ‘unintelligent.’

    Dr. Attaran was speaking to the political milieu of Canada. However, a similar partisan education gap exists between Republicans and Democrats in the United States – and similar sentiments often prevail among the American left-leaning intelligentsia towards conservative-leaning voters.

    Throughout the 2016 election cycle (beginning in the primaries) pundits and analysts seized on the apparent “diploma divide” between those who supported Trump and those who did not. This trend continued through the recent 2018 midterms. A subtext running through many of these essays (sometimes even an explicit theme), is that the consolidation of support among degree-holders for the DNC is somehow proof that Democrats’ political preferences are more intelligent, informed, rational or effective than those of the opposition. As comedian Stephen Colbert once put it, “Reality has a well-known liberal bias.”   

    Maybe it does. However, despite the reality that social psychological literature also has a well-known liberal bias, it nonetheless throws cold water on the idea that a constituency’s education level suggests anything about the wisdom of a political party’s policies or platform.  

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  • On Amy Wax, Tenure and Academic Freedom

    On Amy Wax, Tenure and Academic Freedom

    In mid-July the Edmund Burke Foundation hosted its inaugural National Conservativism Conference – an event intended to “bring together public figures, journalists, scholars, and students who understand that the past and future of conservatism are inextricably tied to the idea of the nation, to the principle of national independence, and to the revival of the unique national traditions that alone have the power to bind a people together and bring about their flourishing.”

    One of the speakers at this conference, University of Pennsylvania law professor Amy Wax, generated national headlines for her talk at this conference, which was based on one of her recent publications in the Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Policy, “Debating Immigration Restriction: The Case for Low and Slow.”  

    In her remarks (transcript available here), Wax argued that the United States would be “better off if our country is dominated numerically, demographically, politically, at least in fact if not formally, by people from the First World, from the West, than by people from countries that had failed to advance.” Embracing this ‘cultural distance nationalism,’ she continued, would be tantamount to “taking the position that our country will be better off with more whites and fewer non-whites” – but conservatives should rally around it nonetheless, rather than shrinking away from the ‘best’ policy for fear of being branded as xenophobic or racist.

    In many respects, her comments at the National Conservativism Conference echoed (and built upon) a previous op-ed she co-authored, “Paying the Price for Breakdown of the Country’s Bourgeois Culture,” published by The Philadelphia Inquirer in August 2017.

    In that essay, Wax and her co-author argued, “All cultures are not equal. Or at least they are not equal in preparing people to be productive in an advanced economy.” Anglo-Saxon Protestant bourgeois cultural norms, they argued, are better than virtually all competing alternatives, and we denigrate or move away from those social mores at our peril. In  a subsequent interview about the essay and the controversy it spawned, Wax elaborated, “I don’t shrink from the word, ‘superior’… Everyone wants to go to countries ruled by white Europeans.” Minorities could “get ahead” in America, she continued, if only they abandoned their ‘inferior’ cultural values and practices in favor of her own.

    Many derided these comments as empirically troubled and bordering on white supremacist – leading to an open letter condemning her remarks, signed by dozens of her UPenn colleagues.

    Wax set off a new firestorm mere weeks later for asserting in an interview with Brown University economist Glenn Loury that, “I don’t think I’ve ever seen a Black student graduate in the top quarter of the class, and rarely, rarely in the top half … I can think of one or two [black] students who scored in the top half in my required first year course.”

    These remarks led to widespread calls for her dismissal. The dean of University of Pennsylvania Law, Theodore Ruger, publicly disputed the accuracy of her claims about black student performance and announced that she had been indefinitely barred from teaching mandatory first-year courses as a result of her comments.

    Wax’s latest comments were also condemned by Dean Ruger – and she is once again facing calls for her ouster as a result of making comments many interpret as white supremacist in nature.

    Many have described Wax’s latest controversy as a difficult case on academic freedom and its limitations. It’s not. Tenure and academic freedom, as we currently understand them, were literally created in response to another prominent scholar’s getting canned for making inflammatory statements on race and immigration. That scholar was Edward A. Ross, and many of those troubled by Ross’s firing personally rejected — and even publicly repudiated — his views. Understanding why they nonetheless rallied in support of his academic freedom can provide important insights into the Wax controversy today.

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  • How Universities Help Shape Local and Regional Politics

    How Universities Help Shape Local and Regional Politics

    In a previous essay, I demonstrated that there seems to be a longstanding relationship between the ideological skew of colleges and universities, and the political leanings of the communities they are embedded in. Over the last 30 years, university faculty have shifted dramatically leftward – and so have the communities hosting elite private universities, the “public Ivies” and most other R1 universities.

    This raises the question: are the schools being dragged left by the broader political milieu they are surrounded by? Or, are the universities themselves helping to pull their surrounding communities leftward?

    In a preceding essay on the Heterodox Academy blog, Jeffrey Sachs argued that the former seemed more plausible:

    “Graduate students and professors do not spend all of their time in the library or laboratory, though it can often feel that way. They are also members of the larger community. They are neighbors, worshippers, and volunteers. They join the PTA, watch the local news, and use local services. It seems implausible to think that they are not affected, ideologically or in terms of partisan identity, by these interactions.”

    In a related post for Niskanen, Sachs analyzed the uptick in campus blowups and illiberal moves by some students from 2015-2017. He concluded that the surge was likely the product of passions running high as a result of the extraordinary 2016 U.S. presidential race, rather than marking an enduring change in values among new cohorts of students – as evidenced by the steep decline in incidents as we have moved farther from that election cycle. Once again, in his telling, campus politics are primarily being driven by external politics, rather than working the other way around.

    Nonetheless, in the conclusion to his HxA post Sachs noted, “It is also possible that the causal path runs in the opposite direction and a community’s Democratic PVI is due to the liberal lean of its college or university.” However, he believed this to be “extremely unlikely.”

    Here, I will present some reasons to believe that the casual path may, in fact, cut the other direction: universities might actually be driving political trends in their local communities — and in the country as a whole — rather than (or in addition to) being shaped by them. 

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  • Resistance as Sacrifice: Towards an Ascetic Antiracism

    Resistance as Sacrifice: Towards an Ascetic Antiracism

    This essay is part of a forthcoming special issue of Sociological Forum: “Resistance in the 21st Century.” Suggested citation:  

    • al-Gharbi, Musa (in press). “Resistance as Sacrifice: Towards an Ascetic Antiracism.” Sociological Forum.

    “Racism is both overt and covert. It takes two closely related forms…we call these individual racism and institutional racism… The second type is… far more subtle, less identifiable in terms of specific individuals committing the acts. But it is no less destructive of human life. The second type originates in the operation of established and respected forces in society, and thus receives far less public condemnation than the first type… It is institutional racism that keeps black people locked in dilapidated slum tenements, subject to the daily prey of exploitative slumlords, merchants, loan sharks and discriminatory real estate agents. The society either pretends it does not know of this latter situation, or is in fact incapable of doing anything meaningful about it.”


    (Ture & Hamilton 1992, p. 4)

    This passage, from Kwame Ture & Charles Hamilton’s Black Power: The Politics of Liberation, marks the first use of the term “institutional racism.” The reality the authors described in 1967 remains distressingly familiar today.[1] While overt expressions of what they called ‘individual racism’ have markedly declined in the intervening period (Bonilla-Silva 2017), vast disparities remain between blacks and whites in terms of education (Shedd 2015), employment (Western & Pettit 2005) and wealth (Sullivan et al. 2015); discrimination in hiring and promotion continues (Quillian et al. 2017), as do the predatory lending practices targeting blacks which Ture and Hamilton condemned (Semuels 2018).

    Social scientists often discuss these disparities as outcomes. However, inequality is probably better understood as a process (Abbot 2016, pp. 233-252)– one sustained largely as a result of how systems and institutions are structured and reproduced, and the ways in which people act and interact within them across time.  Systemic racism is not a product (outcome) of people holding the ‘wrong’ beliefs or feelings. It is a function of behavioral patterns — and (unjust) allocations of resources and opportunities — that systematically advantage some, and disadvantage others, within particular contexts. It persists because it is enacted moment to moment, situation to situation. It could be ended if those who currently perpetuate it committed themselves to playing a different role instead – not merely through their words or feelings, but with action.[2]

    This essay makes three core contributions: first, it highlights a disturbing parity between those who are most rhetorically committed to ending racialized inequality and those most responsible for its persistence. Next, it explores the origin of this paradox – how it is that ostensibly antiracist intentions are transmuted into ‘benevolently racist’ actions. Finally, it presents an alternative approach to dismantling racialized inequality, one which more effectively challenges the self-oriented and extractive logics that undergird systemic racism: ascetic antiracism. Rather than expropriating blame to others, or adopting introspective and psychologized approaches to problems that are fundamentally social in nature, those sincerely committed to antiracism can take concrete steps in the real world – actions which require no legislation or coercion of naysayers, just a willingness to personally make sacrifices for the sake of racial justice.

    Next Section: Antiracist Whites, Bad Faith, Inequality >>

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  • On the relationship between ideological and demographic diversity

    On the relationship between ideological and demographic diversity

    It is often said that the academy is dominated by the left. There is certainly a sense in which that is true. In terms of ideological self-identification, for instance, students, faculty and administrators trend decisively left (in ascending order of political homogeneity).

    However, this narrative is also a bit simplistic.

    First, because ideological self-identification is often unreliable. Conservatives often overestimate how conservative they are, liberals (especially highly-educated liberals) tend to overestimate how left-leaning they are. In general, American views on most issues are a mishmash that does not cleanly line up with the political labels they assign to themselves.

    It is also a bit vague.

    What may be more precise would be to say that institutions of higher learning are dominated by some very particular strains of social and political ideology that are popular among native-born, relatively well-off, urban and suburban secular, coastal whites (who represent the demographic plurality within the academy). While reasonably attributable to the left, these approaches are far from the only (or best) ways to go about leftist politics or social activism.

    Indeed, outside elite academic, media and particular corporate fields, these strains of ideology hold very little purchase – but within these institutions, they often do dominate, in a parochial way. And it is often racial, ethnic and other minorities whose views are frozen out in the process.

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  • Comparing Perceived Freedom of Expression on Campus v. Off

    Comparing Perceived Freedom of Expression on Campus v. Off

    As an organization, Heterodox Academy is growing increasingly focused on highlighting not just problems, and what is going wrong – but also solutions, and what’s going right, who is doing it well, and how. Consequently, many of us were thrilled reading Jeffrey Sachs’ recent Niskanen essay highlighting positive trends on campus (although an implication of his argument — that the 2015-7 blowups were tied to broader polarization around the election — is that we may be fast approaching another wave of unrest).  I dove into Sachs’ latest Washington Post essay in the same spirit, eager for good news.

    Therein, Sachs argues that the self-censorship problem on universities seems to be overblown — and is largely a product of (mis)perceptions among conservative students that they will be punished by their professors and fellow students should they contradict the prevailing consensus.  Despite clear evidence that conservative students are deeply concerned about being graded more harshly by their professors for their political views (leading them to self-censor), he asserts there isn’t strong evidence that political discrimination in grading actually occurs.

    I think this latter point is important – and as far as I can tell, it is true. Here, however, I want to focus on a different claim Sachs made in his piece. Citing a recent survey by the Cato Institute he posits:

     “Reports of self-censorship on campus are not much more prevalent than reports of self-censorship among the general public. About 58 [sic] percent of Americans admit they stop themselves from saying what they believe to avoid giving offense…”

    Yet the Cato data actually suggest students are (5 percentage-points) more likely than the general public to agree that current political climate prevents them from saying things they believe “because others may find them offensive.” In fact, they are significantly less willing to share their views on virtually any issue than the general public. This effect is particularly pronounced with regards to crime, guns, poverty, inequality, policing, immigration, foreign policy — for which the relative comfort gap approaches or exceeds 20 percentage points:

    Q: Suppose you were at a restaurant with co-workers after work, or with classmates after school — If any of the following topics came up would you be (somewhat or very) willing to share your views?  % in college affirm  % broader pop. affirm  Difference (percentage points) 
    Health care  80  85 
    The Environment  79  84 
    Education  79  81 
    Abortion  69  76 
    Women’s issues  66  78  12 
    Crime  65  86  23 
    Guns  62  81  19 
    Poverty  61  80  19 
    Queer and transgender issues  61  69 
    Immigration  59  79  20 
    Race relations  57  71  14 
    Foreign policy  54  72  18 
    The police  53  79  26 
    Q: The current political climate prevents me from saying things I believe because others may find them offensive   62  57 
    Q: Do you think the major blowups in the news are isolated incidents or part of a broader pattern regarding how college students respond to controversial ideas?  77  76 
    (more…)

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  • Trump’s Executive Order on Campus Speech is a Raw Deal for Conservatives

    Trump’s Executive Order on Campus Speech is a Raw Deal for Conservatives

    “The political world is playing a very different game, and it’s a game that almost always damages our work in universities.”


    Jonathan Haidt, Chronicle of Higher Education

    One year ago, almost to the day, President Trump declared that the campus free speech crisis was ‘overblown.’ Since then,  the trends have actually moved in an even more positive direction: we’re seeing fewerdisinvitations, shout-downs and blow ups on campuses nationwide.

    Nonetheless, Trump just announced his intent to issue an executive order that would make federal research funding contingent on whether or not a given college adequately protects free speech.

    Again, given that Trump himself believes that there is no crisis, and given that the trends over the last year have been positive regardless, it is important to see this maneuver for what it is: an attempt to give red meat to a Republican base that increasingly views higher education as a culture war issue.

    I want to be clear: this perception is not entirely unfair. Universities, especially elite schools, have grown increasingly ideologically homogenous over the past few decades. The causes are numerous, and only some of them are plausibly within the control of faculty or administrators. However, this growing divide does have important implications for the life prospects of those who find themselves excluded. It has important implications for colleges and universities too: people tend to disinvest from institutions if they do not feel like they have a voice, a place, or a stake in them. Hence the growing calls from the right to defund institutions of higher learning – and especially social research (fields which tend to be far less ideologically diverse than the academy overall).

    Trump’s plan, however, is a betrayal of conservative values and interests. Let’s start with values:

    (more…)
  • How the Media Could Get the Last Laugh on Trump

    How the Media Could Get the Last Laugh on Trump

    “Behind every image, something has disappeared. And that is the source of its fascination.”

    Jean Baudrillard, Why Hasn’t Everything Already Disappeared (p. 32).

    According to a New York Times report, “At the midpoint of his term, Mr. Trump has grown more sure of his own judgment and more cut off from anyone else’s than at any point since taking office. He spends ever more time in front of a television…” 

    During his 2016 campaign, the Donald confessed to developing positions on national security and foreign policy by watching retired generals on the Sunday shows. These days Trump has access to the FBI, CIA and other intelligence organizations — but has repeatedly conveyed that he does not trust them. Hence, he reportedly continues to rely on the media to understand world events, over and above law enforcement officials and intelligence analysts. He recently berated intelligence officials as “naïve” urging them to “go back to school” for contradicting his assessments on North Korea, Russia, Iran and ISIS.

    Yet even as Trump neglects his daily intelligence briefs, he thumbs through the print editions of the New York Times, New York Post, Washington Post and Wall Street Journal every morning – while cable news plays in the background.  Fox, MSNBC and CNN are reportedly “on” constantly, and typically simultaneously, in whatever room Trump finds himself. The president closely monitors how he is depicted in the media, and is known to be especially eager for positive coverage (and sensitive to negative coverage) – even to the point of proposing that the U.S. should launch a new state-run television network to produce positive stories, since the mainstream media isn’t doing it enough. Many of the President’s statements and positions seem to be direct responses to television news coverage on a given day… or occasionally, stories from his Twitter feed.

    Of course, one consequence of Trump’s epistemological diet is that if mainstream media are systematically wrong about something, the President’s thinking would likely be distorted in the same direction. We can see this reality at work with regards to Trump’s commitment to “build the wall.”

    (more…)
  • Securitization Vs. Social Justice

    Securitization Vs. Social Justice

    It must have felt fresh the first time a political figure equated civil rights with national-security crises. Perhaps it was when Frederick Douglass told Abraham Lincoln that by keeping the Union Army all white, he was “fighting rebels with only one arm,” or more recently when advocates for women’s rights competed for who was quicker to endorse World War I — depicting the conflict as a ‘watershed moment’ for women’s liberation.

    Today, this kind of discourse has evolved into its own genre. International relations experts define such rhetoric as securitization: the attempt to turn an issue that is not obviously a matter of national security into one. The crux of the message is essentially: if you don’t toe my preferred line on this issue, you will be putting yourselves or your loved ones at risk — and providing comfort or aid to our enemies.

    For instance, Senator and Democratic presidential hopeful Kamala Harris recently argued:

    “Russia was able to influence our election because they figured out that racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, homophobia, and transphobia are America’s Achilles heel. These issues aren’t only civil rights — they’re also a matter of national security. We have to deal with that.”

    Of course, Harris literally premised her career on securitization. She won her first public office, San Francisco District Attorney, by unseating one of the most progressive criminal justice reform advocates in the country at the time. Harris’s basic argument was that a commitment to sentencing reform and diversion programs was making San Francisco less safe; it was putting criminals before ‘the people.’

    Her bid to shift the conversation — from discussions about social justice to concerns about public safety — paid off. She won the election decisively , despite the reality that violent crime had actually dropped precipitously in San Francisco under her rival’s tenure (perhaps due to the very reforms she sowed public distrust against).

    Politicians rely on securitization because it is effective: When people come to view something as a security issue, they tend to become more supportive of the person who is promising to keep them safe, and less skeptical of the measures deployed to ensure that safety.

    Yet, while a politics of fear is often effective at helping politicians win office, it is typically devastating to liberal democracy: when people are in a fearful state of mind, they become much more susceptible to tribalism, authoritarianism and myopic militancy. They also grow much more willing to tolerate “states of exception” against those whom they deem a threat.

    (more…)
  • Longitudinal Trends: Ideological Diversity In Universities v. Surrounding Communities

    Longitudinal Trends: Ideological Diversity In Universities v. Surrounding Communities

    In a recent book, Land Grant Universities for the Future, Stephen Gavazzi and Gordon Gee analyze polling data from land grant universities and their host communities and find that institutions of higher learning tend to be “islands of blue” which mirror state capitals and major urban areas, inside “vast seas of red” – i.e. the surrounding towns and countryside (which tend to lean decisively Republican).

    Jeffrey Adam Sachs advances a similar argument in a recent Heterodox Academy post: liberal arts colleges and research universities tend to hail from states that lean much farther left than the rest of the country:

    “The average liberal arts college is located in a state with a PVI score of D+6.4 (meaning that the Democratic Party vote share there was 6.4 percentage points greater than in nation as a whole) and in a congressional district of D+6. Even more striking, the average research university is in a state with a PVI score of D+4.1 and in a congressional district of D+16.6. In other words, the leading institutions in higher education – especially those that train future faculty – are located in places far more Democratic (and probably far more liberal) than the nation as a whole.”

    That universities tend to be embedded in starkly liberal communities, he argued, may help explain the political imbalance within institutions of higher learning:

    “Graduate students and professors do not spend all of their time in the library or laboratory, though it can often feel that way. They are also members of the larger community. They are neighbors, worshippers, and volunteers. They join the PTA, watch the local news, and use local services. It seems implausible to think that they are not affected, ideologically or in terms of partisan identity, by these interactions.

    In particular, two potential mechanisms may be at work: 1) exit, in which conservative or Republican graduate students/faculty feel so out of place in heavily liberal or Democratic communities that they choose to either avoid or move away from the country’s top colleges and universities; and 2) conversion, in which graduate students/faculty who would otherwise be conservative or Republican shift their political identities leftward due to community socialization… Of course, it is also possible that the causal path runs in the opposite direction and a community’s Democratic PVI is due to the liberal lean of its college or university. However, this is extremely unlikely.”

    In a subsequent Twitter thread, he expanded on this argument, highlighting how these disparities may also explain the partisan imbalance in commencement speakers: 65% of political figures invited to give these addresses seem to be Democrats. Yet about a fifth of all these invited speakers are local figures (representing a jurisdiction that extends ten miles or less from the university) – and it turns out that officials representing these areas are roughly three times as likely to be Democrats rather than Republicans. For liberal arts schools and research universities in particular, even their federal Congress people and state governors are far more likely to be “blue” than “red” (considering the PVI score of those states).

    (more…)
  • You Can’t Change the World From a ‘Safe Space.’

    You Can’t Change the World From a ‘Safe Space.’

    Most of us who go into the humanities and social sciences don’t just want to understand social problems — we want to help resolve them as well. There strong agreement about what our societies’ biggest problems are (for instance, inequality), and broadly, how to go about solving them (i.e. harness expertise and leverage the state or other major social institutions for technocratic interventions). This is in part because most of us in the humanities and social sciences are decisively on the left.  

    Students in our fields are rarely even exposed to non-secular or non-left viewpoints in the classroom – let alone encouraged to engage them as morally or epistemologically legitimate options (i.e. as perspectives reasonable people, educated people could hold in good-faith). Scholars do not make use of non-left, non-secular, non-technocratic perspectives in working to understand or address social problems (except to define it as a problem that so many people are religious, conservative or insufficiently deferent to expertise). If anything, in the age of Trump, academics seem even less interested in, or capable of, extending any kind of moral or intellectual charity to towards those we view as “the enemy.”  

    On the one hand, this siege mentality is perfectly understandable: in many respects, academics are under siege. However, we hunker down at the expense of our capacity to meaningfully influence society. If we truly want to be agents of change, students and scholars alike need to understand and engage with a much wider breadth of perspectives than we currently do.  

    (more…)
  • The Radical Black Liberation Theology of Kanye West

    The Radical Black Liberation Theology of Kanye West

    Kanye West has always had a streak of what one might call conservatism. He defiantly included “Jesus Walks” on his 2004 debut album, despite repeated urging from record execs to drop it, and predictions that it would never get play. Instead, the single helped make his career. The track begins with Kanye revealing, “We at war. We at war with terrorism. Racism. But most of all, we at war with ourselves.” Expanding on this point, in the track “All Falls Down,” West criticized materialism and irresponsible spending habits among African Americans—and explored how these cultural tendencies are both a product and a driver of what sociologists describe as institutionalized racism: 

    It seems we living the American dream, but the people highest up got the lowest self-esteem. The prettiest people do the ugliest things on the road to riches and diamond rings. We shine because they hate us, floss ’cause they degrade us. We trying to buy back our 40 acres. And for that paper, look how low we gon’ stoop: even if you in a Benz you still a n**** in a coupe. . . . We buy our way out of jail but we can’t buy freedom. We’ll buy a lot of clothes when we don’t really need ’em—things we buy to cover up what’s inside: ’Cause they made us hate ourselves and love they wealth, that’s why shorties holla “where the ballers at?” Drug dealer buy Jordans, crackhead buy crack—and a white man get paid offa all of that. 


    A constant theme of his work is that systems and institutions ostensibly intended to serve black people often keep them subservient instead. Distrust of “the man” undergirds West’s constant critiques of the education and criminal justice systems, as well as his assertion that George W. Bush “doesn’t care about black people.” But the same concerns also inform his emphasis on work ethic, persistence, entrepreneurship, and personal responsibility as essential to creating change. West doesn’t just promote these virtues in his music, he has tried to embody them himself from the outset. As one of his longtime friends put it

    He was really into girls, music, and black liberation as a shorty. . . . We looked at rappers like these dudes are entrepreneurs, they not working a 9–5, they not punching nobody clock. . . . It’s hilarious when I hear people say “Kanye is in the illuminati.” No, Kanye applied himself. When we would be out chasing hoes, there was times Kanye would be with us, but a majority of the time he’d be in his bedroom making beats with the same clothes on for days, no haircut or nothing. That dude was focused since he was a shorty because he knew what he wanted to do…


    Notice how West has always tied these values (hardwork, grit, ambition)—associated most strongly with conservatism—to black emancipation. The idea seems to be that one must start by taking control over what can be controlled, leveraging the resources one has at one’s own disposal first, in order to effectively transform oneself, one’s community, and the larger society. Drawing on these themes, in 2011 West dedicated an entire track to the subject of black-on-black murder — a topic generally perceived as taboo in polite liberal company — and issued a call to “redefine black power” (“Murder to Excellence,” Watch the Throne).

    Ye has consistently insisted that people dwell too much on memories and history—obscuring the possibilities available to us here and now. To drive this point home, in much the same way that many (Kanye included) have attempt to reclaim the “N-word,” West has repeatedly tried to reappropriate symbols associated with racial oppression into signs of black empowerment. The Confederate flag was featured prominently on merchandise and marketing for his Yeezus tour, for instance. In “Ye v. the People,” West articulated that this was the same idea behind his recent MAGA gear obsession: “I feel an obligation to show people new ideas—And if you wanna hear ’em, there go two right here: ‘Make America Great Again’ had a negative perception. I took it, wore it, rocked it, gave it a new direction.” Indeed, he recently paired a redesigned MAGA hat with a Colin Kaepernick sweatshirt!

    (more…)
  • Democrats Should be Very Alarmed by the 2018 Midterm Results

    Democrats Should be Very Alarmed by the 2018 Midterm Results

    After flipping dozens of seats in the midterm elections, Democrats are set to take control of the House of Representatives. Many pundits and analysts have attempted to frame the race as a referendum on President Trump. Among these, there seems to be a consensus that the president has somehow been “repudiated.” Not so fast.

    To be sure, there are reasons for Democrats to cheer: Despite significant structural disadvantages and a difficult Senate map, some great ballot initiatives were passed, state legislatures got bluer in many instances and Democrats won governorships in some key states. These are worth celebrating. Yet, on balance, Democrats should be more disturbed than comforted by how the elections shook out.

    For instance, turnout was much higher than in 2014. However, the increased engagement proved to be bipartisan: Trump’s supporters also showed up in force, significantly undercutting the expected “blue wave.” Democrats didn’t peel off districts that Trump won by 5 percentage points or more in 2016.

    Yes, Republicans ultimately lost control of the House — but even here, the Democrats’ continued weakness shines through:

    (more…)

  • What Was Elizabeth Warren Thinking?

    What Was Elizabeth Warren Thinking?

    Elizabeth Warren has repeatedly identified herself as Cherokee.

    For most of her early career, while she worked at the University of Texas, this was not the case. However, beginning in the mid 1980s, as she was aspiring to move from University of Texas to the Ivy Leagues, she also began identifying herself as ‘Native American’ on professional documents. 

    In 1986 she declared her race as “American Indian” on her registration card for the State Bar of Texas. That same year, she began listing herself as “Native American” in the AALS Directory of Law Professors. She landed a job at the University of Pennsylvania shortly after she began professionally identifying as Native American. 

    The leap from University of Texas to UPenn was quite the step up (especially at that time). She insisted University of Pennsylvania categorize her as “Native American” — and they were happy to do so. UPenn administration highlighted Warren’s appointment in their Minority Equity Reports to show they were making progress on hiring and retaining ‘diverse’ faculty. 

    In 1995, Warren was appointed a named chair at Harvard Law, and the largest salary of any faculty member at the whole school outside of university administration. Harvard has insisted Warren’s ‘Native American ancestry’ made no impact on their hiring decisions. Yet the university immediately held up the recruitment of Warren, a ‘Native American woman,’ to push back against claims that they were insufficiently diverse, and to diffuse pressure to hire more people of color. Warren was also celebrated as Harvard Law’s “first woman of color” in a 1997 Fordham Law Review article and beyond. 

    On the lighter side, she published multiple recipes to a cookbook, Pow Wow Chow: A Collection of Recipes from Families of the Five Civilized Tribes – all signed, “Elizabeth Warren, Cherokee.”

    Yet Warren has consistently struggled to substantiate her claims to Native American ancestry (beyond her grandfather’s “high cheekbones”). She asserts her mother was “part Cherokee and part Delaware,” yet a prominent Cherokee genealogist who traced Warren’s maternal ancestry all the way back to the Revolutionary War era found no evidence of any Native American heritage. Some relatives have publicly disputed Warren’s narrative about their family. And, of course, Warren phenotypically presents as white.

    For these reasons, she has faced consistent accusations that her claims to Native American ancestry were either mistaken or cynical. The President of the United States mockingly refers to her as “Pocahontas” – and told Warren he would pay $1 million dollars to a charity of her choice “if you take the test and it shows you’re an Indian.” He predicted Warren would decline this challenge. It would have been better for her if she had. (more…)

  • On the Sokal Squared/ Grievance Studies Hoax

    On the Sokal Squared/ Grievance Studies Hoax

    Over the past year, Helen Pluckrose, James Lindsay & Peter Boghossian published a series of hoax papers in humanities journals oriented towards the “critical study” of gender and sexuality. Their plot was discovered midway through, forcing them to go public prematurely.

    In a journal-length essay explaining their methods, findings, and intentions, “Academic Grievance Studies and the Corruption of Scholarship,” the authors hold up their publications as proof that research on race, gender, sexuality – along with the discipline of sociology – are defined by groupthink, confirmation bias and motivated reasoning, which allow bogus work to regularly be published in these (sub)fields.

    Dubbed “Sokal Squared,” or the “Grievance Studies hoax,” the incident has become something of a Rorschach Test within academic and media spaces: Those already disposed towards skepticism of “critical” scholarship on race, gender or sexuality view the incident as damning proof of a deep rot within these subfields, and perhaps with social research or academia more broadly. Those more sympathetic to “critical studies” instead see a deeply flawed and limited experiment — and accuse the authors of overstating their findings, speaking beyond their data and, intentionally or not, feeding into the agenda of right-wing reactionaries. There have been relatively few unexpected validators or critics.

    The purpose of this essay is not to adjudicate between these rival perspectives, but to provide some critical context on the background of these types of experiments and this particular study, explore the relevant ethical considerations, and provide a concise description and analysis of what the trio found.

    Background

    NYU physicist Alan Sokal was disturbed and annoyed by postmodern social critiques and, especially, the (mis)appropriation of concepts from the “hard sciences” into social research. And so, in 1996, he crafted a paper which he viewed as not just weak, but essentially nonsensical: “Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity,” and managed to get it published Social Text – a journal which, while not peer-reviewed, regularly published essays by social criticism luminaries of the time. Shortly after it was published, Sokal penned an essay for the American literary magazine Lingua Franca exposing his original paper as a hoax; he then co-authored a book with fellow physicist Jean Bricmont, Impostures Intellectulles, expanding his critique of postmodernism, the misuse of scientific and mathematical concepts in social research, and the lack of intellectual rigor in “critical studies.”

    This was a significant departure from the standard operating procedure:

    Within the social sciences, there was already a well-established tradition of sending problematic papers up for peer review, with false attribution of authorship, in order to better understand how editors exercise discretion in selecting and evaluating work. This line of research dates back (at least) to Abramowitz, Gomes & Abramowitz’s 1975 paper in the Journal of Applied Social Psychology, Publish or Politic: Referee Bias in Manuscript Review.”

    Most of these have included a control group, tested a fairly large number of papers (typically submitted to journals in the authors’ own fields), and – because they were merely testing whether editors would accept or reject the works – researchers did not allow accepted fake papers to proceed to publication, so as to avoid polluting the knowledge environment. Scholars have also tended to be fairly circumspect in detailing the findings and implications of their studies.

    In contrast, Sokal wrote a single paper, submitted to a single journal. He was an outsider to the field he was testing. The paper was allowed to proceed all the way to publication, forcing the journal to retract it when the hoax was exposed. Sokal argued that the fact his piece was published suggests a deep problem with many “critical studies” fields:

    ” The results of my little experiment demonstrate, at the very least, that some fashionable sectors of the American academic Left have been getting intellectually lazy… . The targets of my critique have by now become a self-perpetuating academic subculture that typically ignores (or disdains) reasoned criticism from the outside. In such a situation, a more direct demonstration of the subculture’s intellectual standards was required. But how can one show that the emperor has no clothes? Satire is by far the best weapon; and the blow that can’t be brushed off is the one that’s self-inflicted. I offered the Social Text editors an opportunity to demonstrate their intellectual rigor. Did they meet the test? I don’t think so.”

    As a result of this novelty, and the significance of the journal involved, the incident became a major story in mainstream media outlets in France, the U.S. and beyond. This, in turn, prompted robust criticism of the hoax from Jacques Derrida, Bruno Latour, Gabriel Stolzenberg and others – who argued that the conclusions Sokal was drawing were far too wide given he only published one single (non-peer reviewed) essay; critics also argued that Sokal seemed to be misunderstanding, misrepresenting, and/or uncharitably reading most of the works he (and Bricmont) singled out.

    A year after the hoax, reflecting on these criticisms, and with the perspective distance provides, and seeing how other had been using the hoax to make even stronger claims than he was comfortable with, Sokal published an essay striking a more moderate tone:

    “From the mere fact of publication of my parody I think that not much can be deduced. It doesn’t prove that the whole field of cultural studies, or cultural studies of science — much less sociology of science — is nonsense. Nor does it prove that the intellectual standards in these fields are generally lax. (This might be the case, but it would have to be established on other grounds.) It proves only that the editors of _one_ rather marginal journal were derelict in their intellectual duty, by publishing an article on quantum physics that they admit they could not understand, without bothering to get an opinion from anyone knowledgeable in quantum physics, solely because it came from a ‘conveniently credentialed ally’ (as Social Text co-editor Bruce Robbins later candidly admitted), flattered the editors’ ideological preconceptions, and attacked their ‘enemies’.”

    Ten years later, Sokal wrote a book, Beyond the Hoax: Science, Philosophy and Culture, drawing out themes from his essays on these topics in the intervening years, reflecting on the “social life” of his experiment, and trying to evaluate its significance in retrospect. Here, he again emphasized that his initial criticisms may have been overly dismissive, and perhaps even insufficiently informed. He had come to believe that much of the work he and Bricmont were criticizing at the time was not outright wrong or nonsensical – instead, the dispute turned on deep (even reasonable) disagreements about the nature of scientific knowledge.

    However, in that same book, Sokal highlighted at length the ways in which bad actors — from industry executives to mass media outlets to cynical politicians — have re-appropriated tenets of postmodernism in order to render the population more vulnerable to propaganda and advertisements, and less likely to believe expert criticism of the state or corporations. As a result, in many respects, critical theory may be accomplishing the opposite of its stated purpose (a point previously emphasized by Sokal’s critic, Bruno Latour, in his 2004 Critical Inquiry essay “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern”).

    Notwithstanding Sokal’s own evolution on these issues, his 1996 hoax reenergized criticism, skepticism and resistance towards critical theory – particularly within the field of philosophy. In 1997, the journal Philosophy and Literature initiated a “Bad Writing Contest,” highlighting the most obtuse or meaningless selections of the year – generally targeting critical theorists. The contest achieved peak notoriety in 1999 when Judith Butler took the top prize (she was less than amused).

    In his 1998 book, Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America, pragmatist Richard Rorty urged social scientists and activists to kick their philosophy habit (hat tip to Conor Friedersdorf):

    “Recent attempts to subvert social institutions by problematizing concepts have produced a few very good books. They have also produced many thousands of books which represent scholastic philosophizing at its worst. The authors of these purportedly ‘subversive’ books honestly believe that they are serving human liberty. But it is almost impossible to clamber back down from their books to a level of abstraction on which one might discuss the merits of a law, a treaty, a candidate, or a political strategy.

    Even though what these authors ‘theorize’ is often something very concrete and near at hand—a current TV show, a media celebrity, a recent scandal—they offer the most abstract and barren explanations imaginable. These futile attempts to philosophize one’s way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country” (pp. 93-4).

    Incidentally, in that same work, twenty years before Plukrose, Lindsay & Boghossian (or John McWhorter before them), Rorty also noted the apparent religiosity of critical theorists:

    “The Ubiquity of Foucaldian power is reminiscent of the ubiquity of Satan, and thus of the ubiquity of original sin—that diabolical stain on every human soul… in committing itself to what it calls ‘theory,’ this Left has gotten something which is entirely too much like religion. For the cultural Left has come to believe that we must place our country within a theoretical frame of reference, situate it within a vast quasi-cosmological perspective.

    What stories about blue-eyed devils are to Black Muslims, stories about hegemony and power are to many cultural Leftists… To step into the intellectual world which some of these Leftists inhabit is to move out of a world in which the citizens of a democracy can join forces to resist sadism and selfishness into a Gothic world in which democratic politics has become a farce… in which all the daylight cheerfulness of Whitmanesque hyper-secularism has been lost, and ‘liberalism’ and ‘humanism’ are synonyms for naiveté—for an inability to grasp the full horror of our situation” (pp. 95-6).

    There were many more attempts at Sokal-style hoaxes attempting to delegitimize certain lines of scholarship within the discipline. Perhaps the most prominent of these occurred right around the 20-year anniversary of the Sokal Affair: philosophers Phillipe Huneman & Anouk Barberousse pseudonymously published what they perceived to be a nonsensical article in the Journal of Badiou Studies: Ontology, Neutrality and the Strive for (non-) Being-Queer.” The authors claimed they perpetrated the hoax in order to help dispel the cult around prominent philosopher Alain Badiou (for whom the journal was named). In their view, many credit him a genius because they like his politics, but understand or engage little with his metaphysics – the primary subject of most of his work – which the hoaxers viewed as subpar. Philosopher Justin E.H. Smith (University of Paris 7 – Denis Diderot) wrote in response:

    “But what sort of victory is it? Here my laughter on first reading Huneman and Barberousse’s text quickly gave way to two concerns. One is that the joke is not so much on the abstruse theory-heads, as had surely been the case in the Sokal incident. The joke isn’t on anyone who is committed to any particular ideology or style of thinking at all. The joke is, rather, on the folks running these pop-up online journals with their ludicrously low editorial standards.

    Remarkably, the editors of the Journal of Badiou Studies even admitted as much when they complained of Huneman and Barberousse’s ‘dated’ method of attack ‘in an age when the pressures on independent Open Access publishing include underfunding and time-pressured staff.’ In other words, the editors effectively confess that they do not have the resources to produce a decent journal on their own, and so must rely on the good will of the contributors to not send them crap.

    But many people who submit to journals are not in a position to know of their own work whether it is crap or not, and for this reason alone a journal that does not have the resources to weed out crap would be doing scholarship a far greater service by simply not existing. The problem is compounded in the context of continental European publishing in English, where often, at every stage of production, from writing to proofreading to publishing, all of the people involved speak English, at best, as a second language. What slipped through at the Journal of Badiou Studies does not in fact look so different from what slips through on a regular basis at Springer or Brill.”

    Notwithstanding these concerns, the next year Portland State philosopher Peter Boghossian and mathematician James Lindsay pseudonymously published “The Conceptual Penis as a Social Construct” in the journal Cogent Social Sciences; they revealed their hoax in Skeptic magazine alongside a lengthy critique of gender studies.

    While many who were already critical of gender studies embraced the hoax as further evidence of what they already believed, the duo were also met with widespread criticism (including from Sokal himself!) – most trenchantly for their decision to target an obscure pay-to-play journal that lacked specialists from the field they were targeting. In other words, they could not confidently assert that their work was actually representative of the literature they were trying to critique – and as a result, the strong claims they made about gender & sexuality studies on the basis of the hoax seemed to be ill-substantiated.

    Humanities scholar Helen Pluckrose rose to the defense of Boghossian & Lindsay in the online magazine she oversees (Areo). Even prior to the “Conceptual Penis” controversy, James Lindsay was a semi-regular contributor to this publication — and ultimately served as the bridge between Pluckrose and his Cogent Studies co-conspirator, Boghossian. After some discussion, the three of them decided to work together to replicate the hoax in a way that would render many of the criticisms of the “Conceptual Penis” paper moot:

    They chose to target well-regarded peer-review journals specializing in the critical study of gender, sexuality… and race. Of course, a single published paper — even if placed in a high-quality specialized journal – could still be written off as non-representative: an artifact of a single set of bad reviewers. So the trio attempted to compose and place dozens of papers at well-respected journals that focused on gender, sexuality and/or race.

    (more…)
  • Vox’s Consistent Errors on Campus Speech, Explained

    Vox’s Consistent Errors on Campus Speech, Explained

    The Free Speech Project (FSP), based out of Georgetown University, attempts to document “incidents in which Free Speech has been challenged or compromised in recent years, and collect analysis from various points of view of the struggle to sustain First Amendment Values.”

    This is a great initiative. In fact, Heterodox Academy recently ran a post emphasizing the importance of projects like this: if we want to understand the scope of the problem – and how it is evolving – we need to be looking at behaviors, rather than whether or not people say they support free speech in polls. Many who strongly support civil liberties in the abstract are perfectly happy to declare “states of exception” against those they detest in the “real world.”

    So far, FSP’s “Free Speech Tracker” has pulled together 137 incidents of (attempted) free-speech suppression. Nearly 2/3 of these (88) occurred on college campuses.

    Surveying just over 90 incidents from this database in a recent Medium post, FSP Director Sanford Ungar came to the following conclusions:

    1. Most of the incidents on campus do seem to target people on the right.
    2. However, of those targeting right-leaning speakers, the majority of incidents seem to concern the same four people: Milo Yiannopolis, Ben Shapiro, Charles Murray and Ann Coulter.
    3. Many on the left were also targeted in campus incidents.

    Self-consciously speaking just a little beyond his data, Dr. Ungar suggests that were conservatives to focus more on inviting right-leaning intellectuals rather than visitors who have “built a brand of disruption” then it is likely they would face decreased incidences of suppression. He also posits, regarding the myriad laws being passed to help “fix” institutions of higher learning – often these “cures” seem to be worse than the “disease” they are trying to address.

    Many in Heterodox Academy share these sentiments. In fact, HxA Research Associate and NYU Law student Nick Philips has argued both of these points in recent publications: campus conservatives must check their own trolling; attempting to legislate away the socio-political tensions within universities is probably a bad idea. FYI: Nick is a conservative. These do not have to (and should not) be partisan issues.

    A few things are critical to note here:

    Dr. Ungar’s analysis had nothing to say about the overall prevalence of these incidents. Its purpose was just to look at who is targeted and under what circumstances. Even for this very narrow set of questions, he emphasized that his analysis was “preliminary,” “not necessarily” representative, and that “much data collection and analysis remain to be done.” Additionally:

    “The selection of incidents documented on the Free Speech Tracker is by no means comprehensive and never will be. The results thus far are anecdotal, and despite efforts to avoid it, there could be a selection bias in the incidents chosen. And the classification of people whose expression is compromised as being on the ‘right’ or the ‘left’ may well be subjective and arbitrary.”

    In light of these realities, it would seem absurd to infer anything about how common free speech incidents are overall on the basis of Dr. Ungar’s preliminary data… Yet that’s exactly what Vox recently tried to do. (more…)

  • Q&A: Why Care About Ideological Diversity in Social Research?

    Q&A: Why Care About Ideological Diversity in Social Research?

    Perhaps the most common response I get from my fellow scholars when I mention the dearth of conservative perspectives in the academy (and especially in social research fields) is something like, “what about other historically disadvantaged or underrepresented groups? Isn’t the underrepresentation of blacks, Hispanics, women, LGBTQ scholars a bigger problem than the lack of conservatives?”

    That depends on what you mean by a ‘bigger problem.’ If the question is, ‘aren’t African Americans, women, LGBTQ people more underrepresented in the academy than conservatives?’ then the answer to that question is ‘no.’ Directly comparing base-rates in the general population to representation in the academy, universities actually seem to be far more diverse in terms of race, gender, or even sexuality than in terms of political diversity.

    In social research fields, conservatives are actually the single most underrepresented group.

    Below, I detail the most common responses progressive academics offer when confronted with these data — and answer these objections by drawing on the best available empirical evidence for the questions and concerns raised.

    For those who want to advocate ideological (and political) diversity in social research and pedagogy but face skeptical colleagues and students — or for those who are themselves skeptical — this post is intended to be a resource for you:

    (more…)
  • Abandoning the Iran Deal is a Grave Miscalculation

    Abandoning the Iran Deal is a Grave Miscalculation

    Many people understand credibility to mean something like, “sticking to one’s word” or “following through on one’s commitments.” By this standard, President Trump’s Tuesday decision to withdraw the United States from the Iran Deal (formally, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) would bolster Trump’s cred. After all, during his campaign he claimed it was his “number one priority to dismantle the disastrous deal with Iran.”

    Granted, it took him a year and half to realize his #1 priority — perhaps because he has spent about 1 out of every 4 days of his presidency golfing, and an average of one day per week at Mar-a-Lago. But here we are, promise kept. Credibility secured. Indeed, Trump’s boosters believe that his “tough” stance will show the North Koreans, who are currently poised to enter talks with the U.S., that the President will only accept the best of deals.

    Just one problem: credibility has nothing to do with following through on one’s word. With regards to threats, for instance, empirical studies overwhelmingly show that no one looks back at their rivals’ previous statements and tabulates their follow-through record. What matters are the stakes a given country has in a particular outcome and the current power dynamics between the countries in question.

    With regards to agreements, strategic credibility boils down to whether or not potential allies have a sense that if they throw in their lot with you, it will likely work out well for them. This is all people really care about when they are considering an alliance: a positive outcome. And by this standard, reneging on the Iran Deal is disastrous for American credibility.

    (more…)

  • Rethinking the Role of Race/Racism in the 2016 Election

    Rethinking the Role of Race/Racism in the 2016 Election

    I am pleased to announce a publication in the peer-reviewed journal, The American Sociologist: “Race and the Race for the White House: On Social Research in the Age of Trump” (non-paywalled link).

    The essay demonstrates that a good deal of the social science research “proving” that race / racism was one of the primary drivers of Trump’s victory seems to suffer from glaring errors — and that these errors go unnoticed by the authors, peer-reviewers, the journalists who feature the work and the other academics who later cite it, apparently as a result of motivated cognition and confirmation bias.

    The conclusion of the work explains why this is a problem that social researchers must urgently address. Unfortunately, I am not yet able to post the body of the paper on this site. However, this post collects a number of resources on this topic:

    • Here is an interview of me discussing the paper, and the practical political implications of failing to understand why Trump won, on the Robert Wright Show. And I extend my critique to that much-discussed study by Diana Mutz on “status threat” and Trump support — showing it also suffers from glaring inferential, methodological (and even logical) errors.
    • Here is an interview with the National Review on my findings on race, the broader problems of biased social research, and a takedown of the Ta-Nehisi Coates approach to antiracism.
    • Here is a summary of the different studies produced by Heterodox Academy.
    • Here I demonstrate that the same tendencies that distort research on the role of race in the 2016 cycle also hold for the literature on the role of gender/sexism.
    • Here is show that the same kinds of issues that plague social research fields also tend to undermine the media — including (especially) on the topic of Trump.

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  • (How) The Lack of Conservatives in the Academy Harms Progressive Scholars (Most)

    (How) The Lack of Conservatives in the Academy Harms Progressive Scholars (Most)

    It is no longer a matter of dispute whether increasing diversity of perspectives enriches understanding of social issues. Conversations about diversity at institutions of higher learning typically turn on questions of race, gender and sexuality. More recently, class, geography and the intersections between categories of underrepresentation have been integrated into the discussion.

    However, viewpoint diversity remains controversial: many believe it is acceptable – and even desirable – to exclude non-progressive perspectives. Indeed, while increased education mitigates prejudice on the grounds of factors like race, it actually renders people more likely to discriminate against those who hold different beliefs or commitments.

    In fact, while there has been noteworthy progress made since the 1990s in terms of representation for women and racial minority groups, the ideological underrepresentation problem is growing worse:

    Although students are more likely to identify as “liberal” or “progressive” today than they were in the 1990s, faculty members have shifted much farther to the left. Given early indicators that those in Generation Z are more conservative than millennials in many respects (see here, here, here, here for instance), the ideological gap between faculty and students seems set to grow even larger. And of course, college students already tend to be far to the left of the mainstream US population. Therefore, the rift between academics and the societies they are supposed to inform and advise will likely grow much more severe as well.

    Already, in social research fields (the humanities and social sciences), the scale of ideological underrepresentation is vastly more pronounced than disparities along the lines of gender, sexuality or even race. (more…)

  • First the Farce, then the Tragedy

    First the Farce, then the Tragedy

    “Hegel remarks somewhere that all facts and personages of great importance in world history occur, as it were, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce.”

    Karl Marx, ‘The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’ (Chapter 1)

    “Be careful how you move, the traps are covered in the lights. Landmines be disguised as welcome signs — I’ll repeat it so you ain’t got to press rewind: The landmines be disguised as welcome signs…”

    Mos Def, ‘Fake Bonanza’ (True Magic)

    So far Mueller’s investigation has not established any kind of direct and intentional collusion between Russia and the Trump campaign – let alone anything implicating the president himself. Absent clear and undeniable proof (or perhaps even given proof, for that matter), it seems implausible that Congress will have the votes to impeach Trump or otherwise hold him accountable prior to 2020. As the probe drags on, in the absence of a “smoking gun,” the whole affair may end up seeming so complex, muddy and partisan that even most of the public just throws their hands up, eager to talk about something else.

    All this buildup and … nothing.

    Shocking, right?  It shouldn’t be. If media pundits had paid greater (or any) attention to the last major case of foreign meddling and collusion in a U.S. presidential race, this underwhelming resolution would have seemed perfectly natural:

    Not so “Unprecedented”

    In 1996, Republican presidential nominee Bob Dole decided to take a hard line on China—portraying the nation as a growing economic and geopolitical threat to the United States and a violator of international rules and norms.  In response, China tried to leverage their extensive diplomatic, intelligence and financial networks in the United States in order to sway the election in favor of Dole’s rival, Democrat Bill Clinton.

    This is not a theory, it is an historical fact: there was a major federal investigation. In the end, several prominent Democratic fundraisers, including close Clinton associates, were found to be complicit in the Chinese meddling efforts and were convicted on charges ranging from conspiracy and espionage to violations of campaign finance and disclosure laws (most notably James T. Raidy, Johnny Chung, John Huang, Charlie Trie, Maria Hsia and Ng Lap Seng). Several others fled the country to escape U.S. jurisdiction as the probe got underway. The Democratic National Committee was forced to return millions of dollars in ill-gotten funds (although by that point, of course, their candidate had already won).

    It was a scandal that persisted after the election in no small part because many of Clinton’s own policies in his second term seemed to lend credence to insinuations of collusion:

    Then, as now, rather than attempting to punish the meddling country for undermining the bedrock of our democracy, Bill Clinton worked to ease sanctions and normalize relations with Beijing — even as the U.S. ratcheted up sanctions against Cuba, Iran and Iraq. By the end of his term, he signed a series of sweeping trade deals that radically expanded China’s economic and geopolitical clout—despite his administration’s own forecast that this would come at the expense of key American industries and U.S. manufacturing workers.

    Clinton authorized a series of controversial defense contracts with China as well — despite Department of Justice objections. Federal investigators were concerned that the contractors seemed to be passing highly sensitive and classified information to the Chinese, well beyond what was authorized to share. And indeed, the companies in question were eventually found to have violated the law by giving cutting-edge missile technology to China, and paid unprecedented fines related to the Arms Export Control Act during the administration of George W. Bush. But they were inexplicably greenlit by Bill Clinton in the interim despite the red flags.

    Polls showed that the public found the President’s posture on China to be so disconcerting that most supported appointing an independent counsel (a la Mueller) to investigate whether the Clinton Administration had essentially been “bought.”

    Law enforcement officials shared these concerns: F.B.I. director Louis Freeh (whom Clinton could not get rid of, having just fired his predecessor) very publically called for the appointment of an independent counsel. So did the chief prosecutor charged with investigating Chinese meddling, Charles La Bella. However, they were blocked at every turn by Clinton’s Attorney General, Janet Reno—eventually leading LaBella to resign in protest of the AG’s apparent obstruction.

    (more…)

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  • Navigating Moral Disagreements: Three Strategies from the Literature on Moral and Cultural Cognition

    Navigating Moral Disagreements: Three Strategies from the Literature on Moral and Cultural Cognition

    We in America and Western Europe, and by now many other places in the world, have this idea of people as fundamentally rational. On this account, our profound cognitive abilities are designed to help us discover objective truths about the world through logical argument and empirical observation. Contemporary research in cognitive science, psychology and related fields paints a much different picture.

    For instance, we like to think that in the event of disagreement, presenting facts or statistics, or appealing to rational standards, could help establish common ground that we can build from. In reality, unless and until common ground is already established, appeals to these kinds of allegedly objective criteria often polarize people more.

    And when threatened or cornered by the evidence, rather than conceding, we often simply kick debates into the moral sphere, where claims become much more difficult to falsify.  In these instances, not only does empirical evidence lose most of its force, but even arguments appealing to rivals’ own perceived interests can backfire.

    Now, often in elite media circles or academic circles, these tendencies are discussed as the products of ignorance, a lack of cognitive sophistication, or the result of naïve dogmatism. “Those people” resist facts and logic, “they” are driven by prejudices and superstitions. “We”, on the other hand, are open-minded. “Our” beliefs are derived from evidence and facts. We are committed to “the truth” rather than being driven by ideology.

    But here again, in many respects, basically the opposite seems to be true:In fact, the more intelligent, educated or rhetorically skilled one is, the less likely it becomes that someone will change their minds when confronted with evidence or arguments that challenge their priors. There are two big tendencies driving this phenomenon.

    The first is that in virtue of knowing more about the world, or being better at arguing, etc. people are just better equipped to find ways of punching holes in inconvenient facts, or finding reasons to justify ‘sticking to their guns.’ Indeed, one becomes more likely to really enjoy arguing – and to engage in political research and arguments as a hobby — as they grow more intellectually and rhetorically capable.

    Perhaps surprising, but also somewhat intuitive if you think about it, highly-educated or intelligent people tend to be far more ideological than the general public. They are more likely to be partisan, to be obsessed with some moral-political cause, or to use some intellectual framework or idealized model to interpret the world.

    And while educated people may be less likely to discriminate against others on the basis of factors like race, they are significantly more likely to be prejudiced against people who think differently than them, or hold different ideological commitments.

    Given that moralized debates are nearly impervious to all the tactics we’ve been trained to rely on — appeals to incentives/ disincentives, appeals to logic or facts, etc. — I am going to detail three strategies that the literature on moral psychology and cultural cognition recommends for making moralized disagreements more tractable, and debates more productive.

    (more…)
  • Any Progressive Scholar Could End Up Like George Ciccariello-Maher

    Any Progressive Scholar Could End Up Like George Ciccariello-Maher

    George Ciccariello-Maher, formerly an Associate Professor of Politics & Global Studies at Drexel University, was effectively forced out of his position after describing the Las Vegas massacre as a product of a ‘white supremacist patriarchy’ which must be dismantled. In truth, this is actually a fairly standard narrative among progressives in response to mass shootings or political violence (e.g. here, here). However, Dr. Ciccariello-Maher and his university found themselves facing a particularly harsh campaign of harassment, intimidation and coercion in the wake of these comments – in part because this was not their first run-in with the right-wing media outrage machine.
    (more…)

  • Charlottesville and Americans’ Increasingly Polarized Response to Terrorism, Political Violence

    Charlottesville and Americans’ Increasingly Polarized Response to Terrorism, Political Violence

    On the night of August 11th, white nationalists held a torch-lit pride parade through the University of Virginia in Charlottesville. They were met with counter-protests, and the demonstrations descended into a melee.

    The next morning, these same organizers held a “Unite the Right” rally in Emancipation Park, centered on a statue of Confederate General Robert E. Lee that had been scheduled for removal. Once again, battle lines were drawn, and a fight ensued. This time, the white nationalists were driven back by the counter-demonstrators and then dispersed by police.

    While most of the others in the nationalist camp were retreating, one young man aligned with the movement rammed his car into the crowd of counter-demonstrators who were celebrating their victory—killing one and injuring dozens of others. Two state police officers assigned to help contain the unrest also perished en route when their helicopter crashed.

    The method of violence deployed against the counter-protestors in Charlottesville seemed to draw inspiration from a string of ISIS-aligned attacks involving motor vehicles. In fact, ISIS claimed responsibility for an incident that occurred days later, when terrorists piloted a van into a pedestrian zone in Barcelona, Spain—killing 13 people and wounding more than 100. It is a common tactic of ISIS to try and “one-up” atrocities committed by others while frenzy about the initial attack is at its height, in order to divert the massive public attention and outrage towards their own cause instead.

    In this instance, ISIS was unsuccessful in capturing the public, because President Trump’s subsequent remarks–which seemed to praise many of the ethnic nationalist demonstrators as “very fine people,” and to place ethnic nationalists and those protesting against them on equivocal moral standing — generated immense blowback from across the political spectrum and seemed to suck the oxygen away from all other stories.

    However, for social scientists, symmetrical incidents such as those in Charlottesville and Barcelona can often serve as the basis for “natural experiments”—for instance, to explore whether public reaction to terrorist acts seems to vary in systematic ways when one key variable is changed, such as the ideology or cause of the perpetrator.

    My extensive research on this question shows that progressives and conservatives tend to respond to terror attacks in sharply divergent ways—with the biggest contrast occurring when the attacker is either a Muslim or an ethnic nationalist. (more…)

  • Gender Differences, Silicon Valley and that Controversial Google Memo

    Gender Differences, Silicon Valley and that Controversial Google Memo

    Google software engineer James Damore set off a firestorm with the publication of a company memo titled “Google’s Ideological Echo Chamber.” The essay criticized Google’s policies for promoting a more diverse and inclusive workplace, alleging that they instead fostered a company culture of fear and conformity which runs contrary to the company’s stated ethos–and likely its economic interests as well.

    Upon being leaked to the press, the blowback against his memo was swift and fierce. A widely-circulated response from former Google employee Yonatan Zunger is emblematic of the prevailing consensus, reading in part:

    “(1) Despite speaking very authoritatively, the author does not appear to understand gender.  (2) Perhaps more interestingly, the author does not appear to understand engineering.  (3) And most seriously, the author does not appear to understand the consequences of what he wrote, either for others or himself.​ I’m not going to spend any length of time on (1); if anyone wishes to provide details as to how nearly every statement about gender in that entire document is actively incorrect, and flies directly in the face of all research done in the field for decades, they should go for it. But I am neither a biologist, a psychologist, nor a sociologist, so I’ll leave that to someone else.”

    Well, I am a sociologist—and one who happens to specialize in social psychology and cognition. And I’d be happy to take up Mr. Zunger’s challenge and discuss the scientific evidence related to cognitive differences between men and women. But first, it is important to highlight a troubling aspect of his rejoinder, which was echoed in many other articles criticizing Mr. Damore and his claims. (more…)

  • Want to shake up the status quo? Account for the default effect.

    Want to shake up the status quo? Account for the default effect.

    Observers typically assume that if people are dissatisfied with a state of affairs, they will work to change it. Cognitive and behavioral scientists know that this assumption frequently fails as a result of the “default effect

    For instance, Americans have widespread concerns about how software and entertainment companies are collecting and using their data or manipulating their choices.

    Yet, in most cases companies do disclose what data they collect and what they do with it. Typically, they allow consumers to adjust their settings in order to exert greater control over what gets disclosed and how it’s used—and even provide the ability to “opt out” of features that users find undesirable.

    Nonetheless, only around 5 percent of users meaningfully adjust their default settings. In fact, most will never even read the terms of service agreement. This is because, for most, it would require a prohibitive investment in time and effort to effectively navigate the “legalese” of service contracts, or to understand what the default settings are, identify which ones they’d like to change, how to change them, and the implications of those changes.

    Hence, we arrive in a situation where, despite people being deeply unsatisfied with the status quo, almost no one attempts to do anything about it. (more…)

  • Progressives, Vulnerable Groups Most in Need of Campus Free Speech Protections

    Progressives, Vulnerable Groups Most in Need of Campus Free Speech Protections

    Harvard President Drew Faust gave a ringing endorsement of free speech in her recent 2017 commencement address. There was, however, one passage where Faust chose to focus on the price of Harvard’s commitment to free speech, arguing that it “is paid disproportionately by” those students who don’t fit the traditional profile of being “white, male, Protestant, and upper class.” That point has been illustrated by a few recent controversies over speakers whose words were deemed offensive by some members of those non-traditional groups of students. But focusing solely on those controversies, and on a handful of elite campuses, risks obscuring a larger point: Disadvantaged groups are also among the primary beneficiaries of vigorous free speech protections.

    Universities have often served as springboards for progressive social movements and helped to consolidate their gains. They have been able to fulfill these functions largely by serving as spaces where ideas—including radical and contrarian ideas—could be voiced and engaged with.

    Today, many universities seem to be faltering in their commitment to this ideal, and it is the vulnerable and disenfranchised who stand to lose the most as a result. This becomes particularly clear when we leave the world of elite private universities and consider the kinds of academic institutions most students attend, particularly students of color. (more…)

  • Historical Patterns Suggest Trump Will Probably Win a Second Term

    Historical Patterns Suggest Trump Will Probably Win a Second Term

    6/30/2020 Update: I have been bullish about Trump’s prospects from 2016, through the midterms, his impeachment, and even through the COVID-19 outbreak. In the early stages of the pandemic, Trump’s approval ticked up. And indeed, even today Trump continues to receive high marks for his handling of the economy, despite many Americans being out of work, facing foreclosure, etc.

    However, many Trump voters, especially swing voters, seem to be turning on him — as a result of his grotesque response to the killing of George Floyd and the protests that followed. A trend that is most pronounced among white former Trump supporters. The president continues to hold his margins with minorities.

    (8/6/2020 update: much more on this available here).
    (11/2/20 update: still more on these dynamics available here.)

    While there is still plenty of time go in this campaign — and the race will likely tighten depending on who Biden chooses as his VP (a decision far more consequential than usual given Biden’s age and health) — and as Biden is inevitably forced to emerge from his Coronavirus bunker rather than simply letting Trump destroy himself. However, as things stand, there seems to be a strong possibility that Trump could join Carter in being the only true cases since the Civil War where are party took power and didn’t manage to stay in power for at least 8 years.

    However, what the investigation that follows definitely does suggest is that the landslide many seem to be expecting for Biden probably won’t come to pass. It’ll likely be much closer than most are expecting, and Trump could well pull off another upset.


    “Everyone’s unhappy. Everyone’s ashamed. We all just got caught looking at somebody else’s page. Nothing every went quite exactly as we planned: Our ideas held no water, but we used them like a dam.”

    Modest Mouse, “Missed the Boat,” We Were Dead Before The Ship Even Sank

    In the lead-up to the 2016 election, Nate Silver offered Trump a 29% chance of taking the White House–and was widely disparaged for being far too generous to Trump!

    Obviously, the Donald won. So what should we make of all the professional prognosticators who incessantly and near-unanimously assured us that it was impossible (or perhaps just ‘totally implausible’ if they were feeling charitable) that this outcome could come about?

    Perhaps we should cut them some slack? After all, sometimes things happen that are legitimately improbable. Indeed, events such as these are often key drivers of history (which, arguably, makes them all the more important to “get right.” But that’s another matter). There’s a case to be made that Trump’s election was just this sort of phenomenon.

    I don’t buy it.

    Some Black Swans are events for which there was truly very little warning, or involve forces which are so complex and ill-understood that reliable prediction is impossible. Other Black Swans are merely events that are inconceivable given a certain set of assumptions, references or manners of thought. Trump’s election falls into this latter category.

    Most analysts and pundits were absolutely convinced all the way until that last moment that Trump would not be able to win the Republican nomination. After he won the nomination, there was a lot of talk about lessons learned. However, almost immediately after Clinton secured her nomination it was depicted as virtually inevitable that she would win the general election—probably in a landslide (here, here, here for example).

    Yet there was ample reason to believe things would go the other way. This is not an incident of hindsight bias: I realized early on that that Trump would likely not only win the Republican nomination, but the presidency as well. I predicted that he would beat Hillary Clinton explicitly, unequivocally and “on the record” for the first time in March 2016, and spent much of the remaining year urging Trump’s opposition to take his candidacy seriously and to better understand and respond to the factors driving his success.  In vain.

    After Trump won the general election, yet again there were avowals of lessons learned. But already narratives are emerging that 2018 and 2020 will be bloodbaths for the president and his party (if he even lasts that long in office). Rather than succumbing to this sort of wishful thinking, I decided to look for strong indicators as to how the race might go.

    Polling this early in Trump’s administration seemed unlikely to be predictive—especially as the polls themselves proved somewhat unreliable in the 2016 cycle overall (particularly at the state level). Statistically speaking, it seemed the best way to start was to look at the base-rate for reelection in U.S. presidential races.

    (more…)

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  • The Media Bubble is a Thing. For Real.

    The Media Bubble is a Thing. For Real.

    In a recent article for the Times Higher Education I pointed out how the lack of ideological diversity among social researchers not only undermines the extent to which research is trusted, funded or utilized, but also undermines researchers’ “capacity to understand phenomena, predict trends, or craft effective interventions.”

    Journalistic outlets face many of the same challenges as academic institutions. Like the academy (especially social research fields), most newsrooms skew decisively left. According to the American Journalism project — one of the longest-running and most comprehensive studies of U.S. journalists (conducted every ten years since 1972) — only about 7% of contemporary journalists are Republicans. This is a major decrease as compared to previous studies, suggesting that much like U.S. institutions of higher learning, there has been a significant and fairly rapid ideological shift in newsrooms since the 90s. The American Journalism report also shows that, like the academy, journalism is also suffering a legitimacy crisis driven, in part, by the perceived distance between reporters and the publics they are supposed to serve.

    A recent study by Jack Shafer and Tucker Doherty, published by Politico, demonstrates just how vast this divide has grown:

    “Where do journalists work, and how much has that changed in recent years? To determine this, my colleague Tucker Doherty excavated labor statistics and cross-referenced them against voting patterns and Census data to figure out just what the American media landscape looks like, and how much it has changed.

    The results read like a revelation. The national media really does work in a bubble, something that wasn’t true as recently as 2008. And the bubble is growing more extreme. Concentrated heavily along the coasts, the bubble is both geographic and political. If you’re a working journalist, odds aren’t just that you work in a pro-Clinton county—odds are that you reside in one of the nation’s most pro-Clinton counties…

    …The ‘media bubble’ trope might feel overused by critics of journalism who want to sneer at reporters who live in Brooklyn or California and don’t get the ‘real America’ of southern Ohio or rural Kansas. But these numbers suggest it’s no exaggeration: Not only is the bubble real, but it’s more extreme than you might realize. And it’s driven by deep industry trends.”

    (more…)
  • Trump’s Opponents Need to Stop Playing into His Hands

    Trump’s Opponents Need to Stop Playing into His Hands

    What gives terrorists power are the reactions they are able to elicit from their intended targets: hysteria leads to poorly-calibrated reactions that can be exploited to the insurgents’ advantage.

    For instance, it is beyond the capacity of Islamic terror groups like ISIS to, themselves, meaningfully challenge the prevailing global order. However, they have been able to very effectively goad Western nations into undermining their own values, norms, institutions and interests—to curb their own freedoms, rights and civil liberties–and in the name of fighting terrorism, no less!

    What does any of this have to do with Trump? A lot, it turns out.

    (more…)

  • Social Research Will Benefit from Greater Ideological Diversity

    Social Research Will Benefit from Greater Ideological Diversity

    Beginning in the late 18th century, post-secondary education was restructured across Europe—in part under the auspices of accelerating the transition to an envisioned rational and secular age.[1] In order to enroll the broadest swath of the public in this enterprise, institutions and curricula were rendered more accessible, inclusive, and professionally-oriented.

    Similarly, across the pond, in the midst of the American Civil War, Abraham Lincoln signed the 1862 Morrill Act, which establishing public universities, “in order to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions in life.”[2]

    At the time, Nietzsche condemned[3] the “ubiquitous encouragement of everyone’s so-called ‘individual personality’” and the growing trend to curb “serious and unrelenting critical habits and opinions” at universities—discerning as astutely in his own time as Jonathan Haidt today that the use of educational institutions for promoting a particular social vision is fundamentally incompatible with the pursuit of the truth wherever it leads.[4]

    Yet across Western societies, and especially in elite circles, the 18th Century faith persists that a proliferation of education, science, and technology will help usher in a more rational and secular age[5]—one governed by expertise, and defined by worldwide peace and prosperity.[6]  Among adherents of this vision, universities are held in particularly high regard, as incubators of that better tomorrow—where our best and brightest hone the character, skills and knowledge to solve the world’s ills in an environment that promotes reasoned and civil debate, the free exchange of ideas, and an unflinching commitment to truth. However, contemporary research in the cognitive and behavioral sciences suggests a much bleaker picture:[7]

    For instance, rather than serving as an objective base upon which agreements can be built, evoking scientific studies or statistics in the context of socio-political arguments tends to further polarize interlocutors.[8] Both conservatives and progressives politicize science and evaluate its findings on an ideological basis: exaggerating conclusions when convenient while findings ways to ignore, discredit, defund or suppress research which seems to threaten one’s identity or perceived interests.[9] Rather than contributing to open-mindedness or intellectual humility, greater cognitive sophistication or knowledge often renders people less flexible in their beliefs by enhancing their abilities to critique and dismiss challenges, or advance counter-arguments, regardless of “the facts”—thereby exacerbating people’s natural inclinations towards motivated reasoning.[10]

    That is, if one wanted to create an environment which actually promoted closed-mindedness, dogmatism and polarization, contemporary research suggests the following prescription: consolidate societies’ most intelligent, knowledgeable and charismatic people, at a time in their lives when their identities are just taking shape (which increases the perceived urgency of protecting and validating said identities[11]), and place them in a competitive environment focused largely (and increasingly) on the sciences. [12] In a word: universities.[13]

    Perhaps then, it should not be surprising that the long leftward trajectory of U.S. institutions of higher learning seems to have culminated with conservative faculty, students and perspectives almost completely absent from many fields,[14] while dissent from progressive ideology is met with increasing sanctions and scandal[15]—from which even historical figures are not immune.[16]

    However one may feel about these developments from a moral or political point of view, they are harmful for the practice and profession of science–especially for the social and behavioral sciences.

    (more…)

  • In the Trump Administration, Principled Civil Servants Like James Comey Are Critical

    In the Trump Administration, Principled Civil Servants Like James Comey Are Critical

    Let’s be clear about one thing straightaway: James Comey did not sabotage Hillary Clinton. If that had been his intention, it was well within his power to outright destroy her candidacy. In the wake of Attorney General Loretta Lynch’s improper meeting with former President Bill Clinton, the Department of Justice was scandalized. Under pressure, Lynch pledged to follow through on the FBI’s recommendation, whatever it was. The decision about whether or not the FBI would recommend charges was ultimately Comey’s to make, and his alone (indeed, Lynch was so vulnerable after her impropriety that she couldn’t even bring herself to order the FBI Director not to inform lawmakers about the discovery of new emails; she was in no position to deny his recommendations on prosecution). If Comey were out to sabotage Clinton, he would have recommended charges; the DOJ would have had little choice but to proceed with prosecution. Regardless of how the case ultimately fared in court, it would have certainly persisted throughout the entire election cycle—utterly decimating Clinton’s prospects.

    Instead, Comey declined to recommend charges– despite the FBI having uncovered serious violations of protocol which would have likely landed a lower-profile civil servant behind bars. This decision outraged Congressional Republicans, and even many within the FBI, who accused Comey of playing politics on Clinton’s behalf.

    This was not the only time the accusation was made: as the media began combing Wikileaks-released emails that strongly suggested inappropriate relations between the Clinton Foundation, Hillary Clinton’s State Department, and wealthy foreign donors (the latest of many apparent Clinton Foundation violations, see here, here, here, here, here, or here), Comey refused to so much as comment as to whether or not the FBI was considering an investigation into the Foundation—prompting a Breitbart conspiracy theory that he was on the Clinton payroll as well.

    To assuage concerns about a possible FBI bias towards Clinton, he assured lawmakers that if new information arose which seemed pertinent to the investigation, he would notify them promptly. And multiple times after closing the investigation new evidence was found—and each time, Comey notified the relevant lawmakers. And after considering the new evidence, reiterated his recommendation against prosecution—despite enormous pressure to reverse course.

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  • The Big Debate About Microaggressions

    The Big Debate About Microaggressions

    The concept of microaggressions gained prominence with the publication of Sue et al.’s 2007, Racial Microaggressions in Everyday Life,” which defined microaggressions as communicative, somatic, environmental or relational cues that demean and/or disempower members of minority groups in virtue of their minority status. Microaggressions, they asserted, are typically subtle and ambiguous. Often, they are inadvertent or altogether unconscious. For these reasons, they are also far more pervasive than other, more overt, forms of bigotry (which are less-tolerated in contemporary America).

    The authors propose a tripartite taxonomy of microaggressions:

    • Microassaults involve explicit and intentional racial derogation;
    • Microinsults involve rudeness or insensitivity towards another’s heritage or identity;
    • Microinvalidations occur when the thoughts and feelings of a minority group member seem to be excluded, negated or nullified as a result of their minority status.

    The authors then present anecdotal evidence suggesting that repeated exposure to microaggressions is detrimental to the well-being of minorities. Moreover, they assert, a lack of awareness about the prevalence and impact of microaggressions among mental health professionals could undermine the practice of clinical psychology—reducing the quality and accessibility of care for those who may need it most.

    Towards the conclusion, however, the authors acknowledge the “nascent” state of research on microaggressions and call for further investigation. They emphasize that future studies should focus first and foremost on empirically substantiating the harm caused by microaggressions, and documenting how people cope (or fail to cope) with experiencing them. They suggest further research should also probe whether or not there is systematic variation as to who incurs microaggressions, which type or types of microaggressions particular populations tend to endure, how harmful microaggressions are to different groups, and in which contexts microaggressions tend to be more (or less) prevalent or harmful. Finally, the authors recommend expanding microaggression research to include incidents against gender and sexual minorities, and those with disabilities.

    The State of Microaggression Research Today

    In the decade following Sue et al.’s landmark paper, there have been extensive discussions about microaggressions—among practitioners, in the academic literature, and increasingly, in popular media outlets and public forums. But unfortunately, very little empirical research has been conducted to actually substantiate the ubiquity of microaggressions, to catalog the harm they cause, or to refine the authors’ initial taxonomy.

    In “Microaggressions: Strong Claims, Inadequate Evidence,” published in the latest issue of Perspectives on Psychological Science, HxA member Scott Lilienfeld highlights five core premises undergirding the microaggression research program (MRP):

    1. Microaggressions are operationalized with sufficient clarity and consensus to afford rigorous scientific investigation.
    2. Microaggressions are interpreted negatively by most or all minority group members.
    3. Microaggressions reflect implicitly prejudicial and implicitly aggressive motives.
    4. Microaggressions can be validly assessed using only respondents’ subjective reports.
    5. Microaggression exert an adverse impact on recipient’s mental health.

    His comprehensive literature review suggests that there is “negligible” support for these axioms—individually or (especially) collectively.

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  • An Emerging Democratic Majority? Don’t Count on It.

    An Emerging Democratic Majority? Don’t Count on It.

     

    “What is at stake in the conflict over representations of the future is nothing other than the attitude of the declining classes to their decline—either demoralization, which leads to a rout….or mobilization, which leads to the collective search for a collective solution to the crisis.
    What can make the difference is, fundamentally, the possession of the symbolic instruments enabling the group to take control of the crisis and to organize themselves with a view to a collective response, rather than fleeing from real or feared degradation in a reactionary resentment and the representation of history as a conspiracy.”

    Pierre Bourdieu, The Bachelor’s Ball (p. 189)

    “We’ll let you guys prophesy/ We gon’ see the future first.”

    Frank Ocean, “Nikes,” Blonde

    In 2008, Democratic Presidential Nominee Barack Obama outperformed his predecessors John Kerry and Al Gore with virtually every single demographic group, handily defeating his Republican rival John McCain. This success spread to down-ballot races as well: Democrats expanded control over the House and the Senate; they controlled most governorships and state legislatures nationwide.

    Many progressives came to believe that these results were not a fluke, that Obama’s coalition represented the future: an Emerging Democratic Majority that stood to reshape politics as we know it. The logic was simple: most of those who are young, college-educated, women or minorities lean left. Older white men lean right, but whites were declining as a portion of the electorate due to immigration and interracial unions. Therefore, as the older generation passes away and a younger, more diverse, and more educated cohort steps into the fore, America will become more progressive in an enduring way.

    Right now, these predictions are not looking so good. In a virtual inversion of 2008 (only worse), Republicans comfortably control both chambers of Congress. They also dominate state legislatures and governorships nationwide—bodies which arguably matter more to people’s everyday lives than the federal government. Meanwhile, Democrats lost perhaps their best chance in a generation to fundamentally reshape the Supreme Court. And the new Republican Administration seems committed to rolling back many of the signature accomplishments of the most charismatic and successful Democratic President since LBJ.

    In the midst of such a bleak reality, it may be tempting to hold onto the faith that the Emerging Demographic Majority thesis remains essentially sound: Trump is an anomaly, certain to self-destruct, ushered into power as a final, desperate act of defiance by a segment of the population that knows its time is up. However, such optimism would be ill-advised–the electoral trend actually seems to be going the opposite direction.

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  • Trump’s 2016 Victory Should Not Have Been Surprising

    Trump’s 2016 Victory Should Not Have Been Surprising

    As an epistemologist, I generally avoid predictions in favor of trying to determine what is known and how to build upon or utilize knowledge. But when I do feel compelled to go on record with predictions, it is generally with a sense of urgency–to draw public attention to an approaching black swan.

    Black swans are phenomena which seem inconceivable relative to prevailing assumptions and beliefs. Black swan events arise when our conception of the world becomes untethered from events “on the ground.”

    In this election cycle, the broad consensus was that Trump was an amusing epiphenomenon with little staying power and few prospects. By contrast, since the declaration of her candidacy, there was a pervasive assumption that Hillary Clinton would coast to victory. This cycle seemed to turn conventional wisdom on its head at every turn, but nonetheless, as Americans went to cast their ballots even the most rigorous and gutsy of poll analysts predicted less than a 30% chance for a Clinton loss (and even this was viewed by many as being far too generous to Trump).

    To be sure, prediction is a perilous game. But one of the biggest problems in the way we rely on predictions in our public discourse is that pundits are rarely held to account for their reliability. And even in those rare instances where someone actually issues a mea culpa for grievous errors, little seems to be learned in terms of how to approach subsequent developments.

    For instance, “no one” saw it as possible that Trump would win the Republican nomination—even down to the final moments. When he did win, there was a lot of handwringing about humility and lessons learned—but then almost immediately the same narrative emerged again: Trump stood no chance at winning the general election. And not just he, the Republican Party was finished, perhaps for generations, as a result of his candidacy. Things look very different today, with the Democrats standing on the brink of irrelevance, while the signature accomplishments of their most charismatic and transformation leader in generations seem set to be erased.

    The centerpiece of the Democrats’ (over)confidence was their supposed “electoral firewall”—a safeguard they were so sure of that they scarcely even bothered to reach out to these constituents who were supposed to serve as their last line of defense against Trump (ensuring that even in the unlikely event that they lost the popular vote, they would win the Electoral College). How’d that turn out? Clinton is shaping up to lose the Electoral College by a larger margin than those who were defeated in 1996, 2000 or 2004.

    How could this happen?” was the refrain on November 9th. Here’s how: (more…)

  • Why Conservatives Must Reject Trump’s Homonationalism

    Why Conservatives Must Reject Trump’s Homonationalism

    In a RNC nomination acceptance speech widely maligned as dystopian, Donald Trump received rare mainstream media praise for asserting:

    “Only weeks ago, in Orlando, Florida, 49 wonderful Americans were savagely murdered by an Islamic terrorist. This time, the terrorist targeted LGBTQ community. No good. And we’re going to stop it. As your president, I will do everything in my power to protect our LGBTQ citizens from the violence and oppression of a hateful foreign ideology.”

    While heralded as a “watershed moment” for the Republican Party, many failed to take note of what was not said in Trump’s speech. For instance, there was no call for the RNC to revise or reconsider its party platform, described by the Log Cabin Republicans as being “the most anti-LGBT” in the party’s history.

    In order to realize his convention pledge, Trump would later propose the U.S. resort to “extreme vetting” of aspiring immigrants to prevent anyone harboring “bigotry or hatred” towards gender or sexual minorities from entering the U.S. However, there was absolutely no mention of restricting American citizens from going to other countries with the explicit purpose of spreading ideologies which the policy would construe as homophobic or misogynistic.

    That is, in both cases Trump declined to challenge his supporters on their own attitudes or behaviors—instead, the “gay issue” was raised primarily as a means of attacking foreigners and, especially, Muslims.

    In social research, this phenomena is referred to as Homonationalism: a bad-faith embrace of LGBTQ advocacy to justify hatred, discrimination or violence towards some “backwards” other. Before LGBTQ issues became the humanitarian vogue, “women’s empowerment” occupied the same position—with people who were, themselves, staunchly anti-feminist calling for war against Muslims for the sake of “liberating women.”

    However, conservatives in the U.S. should beware of jumping on this particular bandwagon—because if the GOP follows Trump down this path, it is they who stand to lose the most in the long run.

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  • Racially Profiling “Jihadists” Sounds Like Common Sense. Here’s Why It Doesn’t Work

    Racially Profiling “Jihadists” Sounds Like Common Sense. Here’s Why It Doesn’t Work

    Over the weekend there was a series of bombings, and attempted bombings, in New Jersey and Manhattan (where I live). Authorities have identified and arrested one Ahmed Khan in connection with the attacks, which injured dozens of people in the New York area.

    Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump was quick to seize on this incident as further proof of the need to “profile” people for terrorism. Verbatim:

    “We’re allowing these people to come into our country and destroy our country, and make it unsafe for people. We don’t want to do any profiling. If somebody looks like he’s got a massive bomb on his back, we won’t go up to that person … because if he looks like he comes from that part of the world, we’re not allowed to profile. Give me a break.
    Fox & Friends, 19 September 2016

    Following media outcry at his remarks, Trump would (dubiously) deny that he was calling for racial profiling. However, the candidate has previously, and very explicitly, suggested the need this very tactic—for instance, in the wake of the massacre at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando:

    “But look, we have — whether it’s racial profiling or politically correct, we’d better get smart. We are letting tens of thousands of people into our country. We don’t know what the hell we’re doing.”
    Hannity, 17 August 2016

    The intuitive appeal of this strategy is obvious: it seems like a “certain kind of person” tends to commit these acts—let’s pay closer scrutiny to “those people” and we can probably nip a lot of attacks in the bud. In fact, the solution sounds so straightforward that many perhaps wonder why on Earth this practice is not already central to our law enforcement and counter-terrorism portfolio. I will briefly answer that question below:

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